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*********************
The August 31, 2000 report of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness contained recommendations
directed at 14 groups of stakeholders in the financial reporting process. Many of the
recommendations are addressed to more than one group. This Status Report summarizes the
extent to which those stakeholders have responded to the most significant of the Panel’s
recommendations.
Objective and Methodology
The Panel expressed its confidence that the Public Oversight Board (POB) “will monitor the
progress toward implementing the recommendations in [its August 31, 2000] report.” The POB
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accepted that responsibility, and immediately instituted a program for tracking the status of the
Panel’s recommendations.
The POB staff reported to the Board on the status of the Panel’s recommendations on a regular
basis. Information about the status of many recommendations came from the staff’s monitoring
and oversight activities, for example, its oversight of the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) to
whom many of the Panel’s recommendations were addressed. In preparation for this Status
Report, the staff compiled a list of all of the Panel’s recommendations and, to the extent it had
first-hand knowledge, determined the actions taken. If the staff did not have first-hand
knowledge of the status of a particular recommendation, it requested and received information
from the organization or body to whom the Panel addressed the recommendation. (The staff had
no way to determine, however, the extent to which some stakeholder groups, such as audit
committees, were responsive to the Panel’s recommendations.) The Board reviewed the Status
Report and suggested amendments to it. The evaluations included in this Report represent the
judgments of the POB staff, after considering the views of the Board and those to whom many of
the Panel’s recommendations were addressed.
An Overview of the Panel’s Report
While the primary purpose of this Status Report is to summarize how the various stakeholders
have responded to the Panel’s report, the reader also should focus on the Panel’s thought
processes as it considered the environment in which audits take place and formulated its
recommendations. The logic underlying the Panel’s report is helpful in understanding how the
Panel’s recommendations continue to be relevant in today’s environment.
For example, the Panel observed that “audits improve the reliability of financial statements,
make them more credible and increase shareholders’ confidence in them. . . Accordingly, a
fundamental assumption underlying the Panel’s study and recommendations is its belief that, for
many reasons, the value of audits and the public’s need for effective audits remain undiminished
and in fact may be greater than ever before.”
The Panel noted “the dramatic increases in ‘new economy’ service- and technology-based
businesses with predominantly intangible assets; large increases in the number of individuals
who directly or indirectly own equity securities.” It also recognized the “extreme pressures on
management to achieve earnings, revenue or other targets,” and how the technology explosion
“has contributed significantly to the enormous growth in large audit firms’ consulting practices,”
leading the Panel to the conclusion that “examining the efficacy of the audit process alone is not
the answer to assessing audit effectiveness."
The Panel also described the importance of a strong, unified self-regulatory framework for the
profession, noting that an effective regulatory body should have a majority of public members,
be independent of both the profession and regulators, develop an atmosphere of mutual respect
and confidence with regulators, and report periodically to the public regarding its activities.
Those criteria for effective regulation of the profession are no less relevant in the context of the
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current proposals for a successor body to the POB than they were in the Panel’s context of
revisions to the system of governance centered around a strengthened POB.
While the Panel’s proposals to enhance the auditor’s ability to detect fraud – such as through
introducing a “forensic-type” phase in every audit – are described later in this report, it is
important to note that the Panel explicitly accepted the premise that “a GAAS audit is not, and
should not become, a fraud audit.” The Panel also recognized that “the primary responsibility
for the prevention and detection of fraud rests with management, boards of directors and audit
committees,” not with the auditor. Accordingly, the Panel suggested that management needs to
create a culture that deters fraud and “should set and communicate clear corporate policies
against improper conduct. Directors and audit committees should oversee management’s
activities and demonstrate a strong commitment and involvement when problems arise.” Recent
events have demonstrated the wisdom of these observations.
A final example of the Panel’s understanding of the environment in which audits take place and
how that environment affects the financial reporting process is its awareness that “a substantial
portion of litigation against audit firms . . . involves revenue recognition issues” and that
“financial statements generally are replete with accounting judgments and estimates.” That
awareness led the Panel to recommend significant enhancements to auditing standards to help
auditors in auditing revenues and accounting estimates. But it also led the Panel to believe that it
is not auditors alone, but accounting standard-setters and audit committees as well, who have a
role to play in evaluating and making more transparent the judgments and estimates that enter
into the reporting process, thereby generating recommendations to the FASB and audit
committees as well as to the ASB.
The Panel’s overall conclusions can be briefly summarized as follows:
•

The risk-based approach to audits of financial statements is appropriate, but it needs
to be enhanced, updated, and implemented more consistently.

•

Auditors should perform “forensic-type” procedures on every audit to enhance the
prospects of detecting material financial statement fraud.

•

The governance of the auditing profession should be enhanced through a strengthened
POB that would oversee the processes of setting auditing standards, monitoring
auditor performance, and disciplining auditors for substandard performance, as well
as conduct special reviews as appropriate.

While this Status Report indicates that many of the Panel’s recommendations have been
addressed by the various stakeholders in the financial reporting process, no conclusions should
be drawn about the extent to which the actions taken to date have enhanced audit effectiveness.
The Panel’s report was published less than two years ago, and none of the stakeholders has
completed the process of responding to the Panel’s recommendations. In many cases, new
standards or other forms of guidance or audit policy are at the draft or Exposure Draft stage; in
some cases, new standards, guidance, or policies have been promulgated but are not yet
effective; and in most cases audits have not yet been performed under those standards, guidance,
or policies. In addition, the Board’s decision to terminate its existence by March 31, 2002, which
3

is discussed below, forestalls the ability to evaluate the extent to which the public interest has
benefited from the POB’s new Charter that was adopted in response to the Panel’s
recommendations for enhancing the profession’s governance.1
Increasing the Auditor’s Responsibilities
The Panel’s recommendations in chapters 2, “Improving the Conduct of Audits,” and 3,
“Earnings Management and Fraud,” were aimed directly at enhancing the effectiveness of audits
of the financial statements of public companies. Those recommendations reflected three major
themes:
•

Definitive auditing standards establish the starting point for promoting quality audits.
Based on this belief, the Panel’s recommendations to the ASB suggested the need to
examine existing auditing standards critically, with the objective of revising or
replacing some or all of them with more specific and definitive guidance containing
imperatives to guide auditors in formulating their judgments and carrying out their
work.

•

Audit firms need comprehensive and vigorous audit methodologies, based on auditing
standards, to drive the behavior of their auditors to a higher plane. Accordingly, the
Panel recommended that audit firms reexamine their methodologies and other
guidance in specific areas to make them more comprehensive and vigorous, that they
enhance the training of audit personnel in those methodologies, and that they convey
a culture of high professionalism as the principal message to their auditors, with
corresponding incentives, rewards, and penalties.

•

The peer review process is a critical element in “closing the loop” to assure the public
that audit performance measures up to high standards and continues to improve.
Thus, the Panel made numerous recommendations aimed at enhancing the
effectiveness of peer reviews by making them more frequent and more rigorous.

Recommendations to the Auditing Standards Board
The Panel's principal recommendation in the area of the conduct of audits is that the ASB
develop stronger and more definitive auditing standards to improve the likelihood that auditors
will detect fraudulent financial reporting. These new standards also could serve as deterrents to
fraud by posing a greater threat to its successful concealment.
The Panel envisioned new fieldwork requirements beyond those now contemplated by an audit
performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). Key to
implementation of the recommendation would be the ASB's creating a "forensic-type" phase on
1

The Board’s decision to terminate its existence, conveyed in a January 21, 2002 letter to the chairman of the SEC,
was the result of the chairman’s announcement at a news conference on January 17, 2002 outlining the structure and
role of a successor oversight body that did not include the POB.
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all audits – not converting GAAS audits into "fraud" audits, but adding or integrating a phase
into GAAS audits during which auditors would approach their procedures with heightened
skepticism and a specific focus on the potential for earnings management and fraud.
The incremental procedures envisioned by this recommendation would be based on the
possibility of dishonesty and collusion, management override of controls, and falsification of
documents. This would modify the neutral concept of professional skepticism heretofore
required in a GAAS audit. (In a GAAS audit, professional skepticism includes a questioning
mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence, but the auditor neither assumes that
management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty.)
The Panel's recommendation specifies that auditors should:
•

in planning and supervising the audit, discuss with engagement team members the
vulnerability of the entity to fraud

•

perform tests directed at the possibility of fraud

•

examine non-standard journal entries

•

analyze certain opening financial statement balances to assess, with the benefit of
hindsight, how certain accounting estimates, judgments, and other matters identified in
the prior year’s audit were resolved

•

consider incorporating an element of surprise or unpredictability in their tests

•

apply procedures in interim periods using a forensic-type approach equivalent to that
developed for annual audits

The ASB immediately formed a task force to consider the need to revise existing standards in
response to the Panel's recommendation, and in February 2002, the ASB voted to expose a draft
of a new Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS).
The Exposure Draft does not call for a "forensic-type" phase, but it incorporates many of the
Panel's specific recommendations. The proposal includes requirements and guidance about:
•

engagement personnel discussing the risks of material misstatements due to fraud

•

expanding inquiries of entity personnel regarding the risk of fraud

•

identifying risks that may result in a material misstatement due to fraud

•

evaluating the entity's programs and controls that address the identified risks

•

planning and performing procedures that respond to the identified risks
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•

planning and performing procedures that further address the risk of management override
of controls, as noted below

•

evaluating audit test results

•

communicating conclusions about fraud to management, the audit committee, and others

•

documenting the auditor's consideration of fraud

The proposal increases the focus on professional skepticism. Audit team members should set
aside any prior beliefs they may have about management's honesty and integrity when
considering the possibility of fraud, and should not be satisfied with audit evidence that is less
than persuasive because of a belief that management is honest.
Revenue recognition ordinarily would be considered an “identified” risk of material
misstatement due to fraud. Thus, in almost all audits of public companies, auditors would be
required to plan and perform procedures that respond to that risk.
The proposed SAS specifies selected substantive procedures that would be applied in the audit of
every public company. The specified procedures respond in part to the risk of management
override that cannot be readily addressed through reliance on controls. The tests proposed to
further address this risk include:
•

examining journal entries and other adjustments

•

reviewing accounting estimates for bias, including a retrospective analysis

•

evaluating the business rationale for significant unusual transactions

In a related effort, the AICPA, in conjunction with other organizations, is developing additional
guidance on programs that corporate managements can use to combat and help prevent
fraudulent financial reporting. This guidance would be directed to several audiences, including
auditors and audit committees, as well as management. Its publication would be timed to
coincide with the planned issuance of the SAS on fraud in late 2002.
The exposure draft of the SAS states that, "by its nature, management override of controls can
occur in unpredictable ways." In recognition of that unpredictability, The Panel believed that
fraud would more likely be prevented and detected if auditors were required in all audits to direct
auditing procedures specifically toward fraud detection, in what it referred to as a “forensic-type”
phase. The intent was for auditors to be creative in considering how fraud could occur and each
year devise tests oriented to that possibility. In addition to areas identified as high risk, the
Panel’s recommendations would have encouraged auditors to consider accounts and locations
otherwise thought to be “low or moderate risk.” This would have recognized that, as the
exposure draft states, “by its nature, management override of controls can occur in unpredictable
ways.”
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The ASB has significantly expanded its existing guidance and believes that it substantially
complies with the Panel's recommendation. While the POB staff would have preferred
implementation of the Panel's "forensic-style" phase, the staff hopes that the ASB's approach
achieves the objective of an increased likelihood of detection of fraud.
The ASB has responded to other Panel recommendations that it:
•

Give priority to completing the work of its technology task force, formed to consider how
auditing standards should reflect the use and impact of information technology. (The
ASB issued SAS No. 94, The Effect of Information Technology on the Auditor’s
Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit, in May 2001.)

•

Specify appropriate minimum documentation requirements generally, as well as in one
specific area, namely, analytical procedures. (SAS No. 96, Audit Documentation, issued
in January 2002, specifies those requirements. In addition, all future task forces will be
instructed to consider documentation requirements in conjunction with revisions or
additions to auditing guidance.)

•

Complete its proposed audit guide on revenue recognition, require cutoff tests of revenue
transactions in certain circumstances, and clarify the standard on the confirmation process
to require confirmation of the terms of significant, high risk revenue transactions. (The
ASB issued an audit guide, Auditing Revenue in Certain Industries, in June 2001 that
provides guidance on those procedures, among others. However, the ASB has not
specifically required cutoff tests or clarified the confirmation standard.)

•

Provide more specific guidance on the use of analytical procedures as substantive tests.
(An audit guide, Analytical Procedures, was issued in September 2001. That guide did
not address the linkage of analytical procedures to other auditing procedures. As
discussed below, the ASB’s Risk Assessments Task Force is expected to address the
linkage issue generally.)

•

Provide additional guidance to assist auditors in determining whether identified
misstatements are material. (The ASB issued four Interpretations in October 2000.
Materiality also was addressed in the revised audit guide, Audit Sampling, issued in July
2001.)

•

Create a GAAS “hierarchy” to specify the authoritative and quasi-authoritative guidance
auditors should follow. (SAS No. 95, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, issued in
December 2001 established such a hierarchy. As part of that project, the ASB catalogued
documents of varying levels of authority in the auditing standards literature. A listing of
these documents will be included in an appendix to the codification of the SASs.)

•

Revise SAS No. 65, The Auditor’s Consideration of the Internal Audit Function in an
Audit of Financial Statements, to establish more definitive and specific criteria and
requirements for testing the work performed by internal auditors. (The ASB’s Audit
Issues Task Force concluded that the discussion in the Panel report did not support the
recommendation and decided not to revise the SAS. However, the AICPA’s Audit and
Attest Standards staff has been directed to update and revise prior guidance in an existing
AICPA Auditing Practice Study.)
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•

Establish a protocol with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to assess the
auditability of proposed accounting standards before they are issued, and formalize the
existing liaison with the FASB. (Although no formal protocol has been established, the
ASB issued a comment letter on auditability issues related to the FASB’s proposed
standards on accounting for business combinations and goodwill. The ASB and its Audit
Issues Task Force worked with the FASB staff on implementation issues that arose
following the issuance in September 2000 of Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and
Extinguishment of Liabilities. The ASB and FASB will continue periodic liaison
meetings to discuss matters of common interest, but they will not be an official part of the
structure of either body.)

•

Initiate a formal collaborative effort with the International Auditing Practices Committee
(IAPC) of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) to harmonize auditing
standards internationally and achieve their global acceptance.2 (The ASB and the IAPC
have initiated several joint activities and attend each other’s meetings. Among the joint
activities is a project to improve the audit risk assessment process and the linkage of the
auditor’s risk assessments to the related audit procedures.)

Several ASB projects that would respond to Panel recommendations are in process. Among the
Panel’s recommendations that fall into this category are several that the Risk Assessments Task
Force – a joint task force of the ASB and the IAPC – is in the process of addressing and has
brought to the full Board for further guidance. The ASB and the Task Force are preparing a new
standard that would expand and make more specific the auditor’s responsibilities to assess risk,
and link the understanding of those risks to assertions at the account balance and class of
transactions level and to the nature, timing, and extent of substantive tests. The eventual SAS is
expected to address the auditor’s consideration of materiality in planning the audit and designing
audit tests, and how materiality and risk assessments are related. The ASB also plans to consider
related documentation requirements. In addition, the Risk Assessments Task Force will consider
the Panel’s recommendation that analysts’ reports and forecasts be incorporated into the
auditor’s risk assessment process.
Additional guidance on auditing accounting judgments and estimates is in process. Also, various
ASB task forces are reviewing the standards of fieldwork not addressed by other specific Panel
recommendations to ensure that they are sufficiently specific and definitive to guide auditors in
formulating their judgments and performing their work. A joint task force of the ASB, the Peer
Review Committee (PRC), the Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC), and the Accounting
and Review Services Committee is performing a similar review of the Statements on Quality
Control Standards. When that task is completed, those bodies should be in a position to
implement the Panel’s recommendation to establish a mechanism for ongoing monitoring of the
quality control standards to keep them current.
The ASB has not yet added a project to address recommendations that it develop more specific
and definitive guidance for multi-location audits. However, the IAPC has such a project

2

IFAC has approved an extended role for the IAPC and suggested that its name be changed to the International
Auditing and Assurance Services Board. It is anticipated that the new board will be in place in April 2002.
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underway and an ASB observer attends the task force meetings. The ASB will monitor the
activities of the IAPC to determine what action it should take on multi-location audit guidance.
Two of the Panel’s recommendations to the ASB – both of which involve accounting standards –
have not been acted on because the ASB believes that the issues involved are not solely within
its purview. The Panel recommended that the ASB specify, in cooperation with the FASB if
necessary, that there be only one method of handling prior periods’ uncorrected misstatements
when determining whether proposed adjustments are material. The ASB considered the issue,
but suspended the project until the accounting issues have been resolved. The Panel also
recommended that the ASB provide expanded guidance and specific examples of the auditing
procedures to be performed and the audit evidence to be obtained when considering
management’s plans for mitigating the adverse effects of conditions and events that raised
substantial doubt on the part of the auditor about the entity’s ability to continue as a going
concern. The ASB would like to undertake a project to revise SAS No. 59, The Auditor’s
Consideration of an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern, but believes that it would
be more effective after the FASB has addressed the Panel’s accounting recommendations in this
area. (See the discussion of the status of recommendations to the FASB below.)
Recommendations to Audit Firms
The Panel’s principal recommendations to audit firms are that they should put more emphasis on
the performance of high quality audits and that senior management should communicate this
message to the firms’ professionals.
The Panel recommended that, in their “corporate cultures,” each firm should:
•

Emphasize a strong commitment to high quality audits.

•

Reestablish the importance of the role of independent auditors within their organization.

•

Ensure that performing high quality audits is recognized as the highest priority in
performance evaluations and in compensation and promotion decisions for all audit
personnel.

•

Embed intolerance for audit failures into the firm’s culture.

In certain areas, the firms should increase and improve their guidance materials to ensure that
they are specific and definitive and they should improve their training materials. The Panel also
recommended that the firms encourage increased consultation among professionals and take
strong actions with respect to auditors who do not consult when appropriate.
In determining firms’ progress in implementing the Panel’s recommendations, the POB
requested a status report from the 13 largest accounting firms in the United States. The eight
largest firms and two others responded to the POB’s request. This report summarizes those
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responses; it is based solely on the firms’ representations to the POB, which made no attempt to
verify their accuracy.
The firms’ responses generally were extensive and provided significant details about their
activities in implementing the Panel’s recommendations. Overall, the firms appear to have been
responsive to the recommendations or believe they had already implemented their substance.
With respect to implementing the Panel’s recommendations relating to firm culture, the firms
believe that auditing is an important part of their practice and that the concept of “zero tolerance”
for audit deficiencies is a part of their culture. Additionally, most firms report increasing internal
consultation requirements and are emphasizing its importance to engagement partners and
managers. Training and guidance are being improved, where necessary. However, most of the
firms did not indicate whether performing high quality audits would be the most important part
of compensation and promotion decisions.
The Panel also recommended that the firms review and ascertain whether they need to augment
their audit guidance in various areas, including:
•

The process by which auditors identify risk.

•

The effectiveness of auditors’ work on internal controls.

•

The linkage of risk assessments to the nature, timing, and extent of substantive tests.

•

The level of involvement of IT specialists or auditors with such knowledge in the audit
process.

•

Analytical procedures, reliance on internal auditors, and reporting to audit committees.

•

Using at least experienced managers to review the resolution of “exceptions” found in
the course of an audit.

•

Cut-off tests of revenue when inherent or control risks relating to such transactions are
other than low, and when there is a high level of sales transactions or individually
significant sales transactions near the end of the reporting period.

•

Using analysts’ reports, forecasts, and other information management provides to the
investment community and the public, to assist the auditor in understanding the entity’s
business and evaluating the materiality of potential adjustments.

The ten firms that replied to the POB’s request indicated that they had responded positively, in
varying degrees, to most of the above recommendations to enhance their audit guidance. Some
needed to make less significant enhancements than others, as they already had built some of the
recommendations into their audit methodologies. A few recommendations did not elicit a
response from the majority, namely, the recommendation that auditors increase their cut-off tests
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of revenue and that a partner be involved in evaluating the client’s reserve activity and other
critical issues during interim reviews.
The Panel recommended that audit firms recognize that the board of directors and audit
committee, acting on the behalf of the shareholders, are the parties to whom they are
accountable. In that spirit, the Panel recommended that firms gain an explicit understanding of
the audit committee’s expectations and respond to them appropriately. The firms believe that
they understand who their ultimate client is and continue to work with boards of directors and
audit committees to ensure that they understand their role.
The Panel further recommended that the firms’ internal inspection programs cover the use of IT
specialists, internal auditors, and experienced audit professionals in the assessment of inherent
and internal control risks and corresponding tests of controls, and the linkage to substantive
procedures. The firms’ responses addressed most of these items.
The Panel report noted the need for improvements in worldwide accounting and auditing quality.
The firms appear to share this view. Most of the firms report that all or most of their
international offices are subject to internal reviews and that each office must meet minimum
global firm standards.
The Panel recommended that the firms ensure that their representatives on the SEC Practice
Section (SECPS) Executive Committee have sufficient authority and responsibility to commit
their firms to protecting the public interest whenever this would conflict with a more favorable
business position, and ensure that the public interest remains the paramount objective in the
representative’s decision-making and voting. The firms have represented that their respective
members have the necessary authority and focus on the public interest.
The firms cited a variety of practices that they believe have helped enhance audit effectiveness.
Among these are:
•

Requiring all professionals to take a computer-based training program, “Consideration of
Fraud in the Financial Statement Audit.”

•

Requiring all partners and managers to take a two-hour training session delivered by
forensic experts to increase the awareness of risks that result in financial statement fraud.

•

Creating an awareness video that covers revenue issues, such as “bill and hold”
transactions, side agreements, right of return, percentage of completion, and channel
stuffing, and a four-hour training course that supplements the video.

•

Creating new practice aids and guidance for receivable confirmations, including guidance
on when accounts receivable must be confirmed and when e-mail and fax responses are
acceptable.
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•

Sharing its client acceptance and retention risk assessment guidance, which includes
performing background checks on key client personnel prior to accepting the client, with
other firms.

Recommendations to the Peer Review Committee
The Panel made numerous recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of peer reviews. One
of the most significant was that the PRC implement all the recommendations in the January 25,
2000, report of the SECPS’s Peer Review Process Task Force. The PRC has made progress in
this regard and continues to work on implementing the recommendations. The PRC conducted a
pilot program during 2001 to test certain aspects of the planned changes to the peer review
process and is planning to implement additional recommendations in 2002.
The Task Force’s major recommendation was that the peer review process provide for
differences between the reviews of the largest firms and other firms, in recognition of the greater
public interest in the largest firms’ audit practices. The Task Force also recommended that some
portion of the review of the largest firms be performed each year, with an annual report being
furnished to the PRC and the POB and a triennial report continuing to be made available to the
public. In addition, the Task Force recommended that the public report on all peer reviews be
expanded to provide more information about the scope and results of the review performed. The
Task Force also recommended that reviewers:
•

Place more emphasis on important issues currently facing the profession, the industry
and the entity whose audit is being reviewed.

•

Place more emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the elements of quality control and
engagements reviewed.

•

Conduct focus group sessions of seniors and managers within the offices reviewed and
increase the emphasis on interviewing members of the engagement teams whose audits
are being reviewed.

•

Integrate the reviews more thoroughly with the firms’ internal inspection programs.

•

Identify best practices and matters for the attention of standard setters and disseminate
this information.

The PRC accomplished the following:
•

Expanded the peer review report to provide more information about the reviews. For
example, the new reports better describe the objectives of a peer review and how they
are conducted. In addition, the peer review reports were streamlined to make them more
understandable in situations where the reports are modified or adverse.
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•

Directed reviewers to conduct focus group sessions of seniors and managers within the
offices reviewed, at least for the largest firms.

•

Changed the SECPS membership requirements to require the largest firms to have
specified annual procedures performed during the years between their triennial peer
reviews. The procedures for 2001 were substantially completed, but no reports were
issued. The PRC intends to fully implement these procedures and issue reports in 2002.

•

Developed pilot supplemental review questionnaires for use on a sample of the largest
firms’ engagements. These questionnaires placed more emphasis on important issues and
on the qualitative aspects of the engagements, although not as much emphasis on the
qualitative aspects as the Panel had in its Quasi Peer Reviews. In addition, reviewers
placed more emphasis on gathering information from interviews of the members of those
engagement teams. While the reviewers collected some information on best practices
and matters for the attention of standards setters, the information was not considered by
the PRC to be important enough to be reported to others. The reviewers’ experiences
with the pilot program were discussed at two debriefing sessions held by the PRC. The
POB encourages the PRC to collect such information in a more formal manner during
the 2002 peer reviews to enhance the PRC’s consideration and reporting of it.

The PRC has made progress on or implemented the recommendations regarding enhancing the
training programs for peer reviewers, evaluating their performance, and making peer review
reports and materials accessible on the Internet.
The Panel made some additional recommendations to the PRC that, for the most part, have not
been accepted or implemented. They include:
•

Making clear to peer reviewers that the POB, as the public’s representative, not the firm
being reviewed, is the primary client.

•

Covering the business aspects of the reviewed firm’s practice that are closely related to
the firm’s professional practice.

•

Developing specific performance measures, to be included in the peer review report, that
relate to the quality of the reviewed firm’s practice/effectiveness of audits. (The Task
Force also made a similar recommendation.)

The PRC has implemented the Panel’s recommendation that peer reviews cover the U.S. firm’s
reviews of selected financial reports/filings of foreign registrants that are audited by the U.S.
firm’s foreign-associated firms.
In many of the technical, firm management, and personnel-related matters that the Panel
considered, the Panel recognized that the peer review process is a critical element in “closing the
loop” to provide assurance to the public that audit performance measures up to high standards
and continues to improve. As a consequence, the Panel recommended that the PRC request peer
reviewers, when reviewing those matters, to:
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•

Evaluate the adequacy of the firms’ policies and procedures, guidance materials, and
training materials.

•

Emphasize these matters in their reviews, often including making more qualitative
judgments.

•

Assess the timeliness, frequency and appropriateness of internal messages from firm
leaders about audit quality.

•

Assess the role that performing high-quality professional work plays in performance
reviews and in compensation, promotion and retention decisions.

•

Assess the extent of time pressures on audit engagements and the firm’s success in
managing those pressures.

•

Include their findings with respect to those matters in their report to the PRC.

The PRC has partially implemented the first five items as part of conducting the focus group
sessions and using the pilot supplemental review questionnaires described previously. The last
recommendation was not implemented.
The PRC intends to amend its peer review standards after it has had experience with and
successfully implemented the Task Force’s and the Panel’s recommendations.
Almost all of the firms that audit public companies are subject to peer review. The Panel also
recommended that the SEC mandate required peer reviews for all firms that audit public
companies. As to foreign-based firms, the Panel recommended that the requirement be extended
to participating in the peer review or similar monitoring programs in their locations. The
Commission responded that, since less than 100 domestic firms that audit public companies are
not peer reviewed, it may need to consider the costs and benefits of mandating peer reviews for
those relatively few firms. The SEC staff supports peer reviews of foreign-based firms and
intends to encourage the efforts of the IFAC in this area.
Enhancing Auditor Independence
The Panel made recommendations regarding auditor independence in two areas – non-audit
services and the governance, operating policies, and POB oversight of the Independence
Standards Board (ISB).
While the Panel did not recommend that auditors be prohibited from performing any or all nonaudit services for audit clients, it did urge the ISB to identify factors that auditors, audit
committees, and client management should consider in determining the appropriateness of a
specific non-audit service. The Panel further recommended that the SEC and the ISB evaluate
on an ongoing basis the effectiveness of the disclosures about the provision of non-audit services
made by auditors to audit committees under ISB Standard No. 1 and by registrants under the
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SEC’s proxy requirements. The Panel recommended that the ISB reconstitute its membership to
include proportionately greater public representation, and that the POB’s Charter give it
oversight of the ISB.
The Panel’s recommendations in these areas have been overtaken by events that transpired since
the Panel’s report and before its recommendations could be implemented. In November 2000,
the SEC issued new independence rules, including new proxy disclosure rules related to nonaudit services; in July 2001, the ISB voted to terminate its existence; and in early 2002 the five
largest accounting firms announced their intent to no longer provide internal audit and certain
information technology services to their audit clients. These events essentially preempted the
Panel’s recommendations to the ISB.
As a result, there is little authoritative guidance on the factors that auditors, audit committees,
and client management should consider in determining the appropriateness of a specific nonaudit service, other than those contained in the Panel’s report. The SEC has stated, however, that
its staff will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of disclosures made pursuant both to ISB No.
1 and the SEC proxy requirements during its review and comment process, enforcement
investigations, and other staff activities. The SEC also has indicated that its staff intends to
consult with the AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) and others to
address independence issues.
Governance of the Auditing Profession
An entire chapter of the Panel’s report was devoted to the governance of the auditing profession.
A major portion of that chapter included a discussion of and recommendations for a new system
of governance based on a strengthened, independent POB with a formal charter that would
specify the Board’s responsibilities and powers.
The POB’s Charter was adopted by the AICPA and the POB in February 2001. Departures from
the Panel’s recommendations are described below. The essential elements of the POB’s
responsibilities and powers granted by the Charter include an initial budget ceiling of $5.2
million, exclusive of unanticipated oversight reviews, that is adjusted annually for inflation;
oversight of the SECPS and its various committees, task forces, and activities; and oversight of
the ISB (see the discussion above) and the ASB.
The Charter differs in certain ways from the Panel’s prescription:
•

The POB does not have sole authority to determine its budget, as the Panel
recommended. The POB staff believes, however, that neither the budget ceiling nor
the Charter’s requirement that it consult with the SECPS Executive Committee and
possibly the AICPA Board of Directors on budgetary matters creates impediments to
the POB’s authority to determine its own budget and financial and other resources,
and the profession’s obligation to provide those resources.

•

The Panel recommended that the members of the POB’s nominating committee
should be appointed by the POB from names suggested by public and private
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institutions that are most concerned with the quality of audits and financial reporting.
The POB’s charter, however, provides for the nominating committee to consist of the
POB chair or designee, a former public member of the AICPA Board to be selected
by the AICPA Board, and a person from the private sector to be selected by the other
two committee members. The POB staff believes that the Charter’s process for
appointing the nominating committee is simpler and better than the process
recommended by the Panel.
•

The POB’s charter does not provide for establishing an advisory council, as the Panel
recommended. Instead, the charter provides for the POB to hold an annual outreach
meeting to solicit views and recommendations about the accounting profession’s selfregulatory program and the POB’s oversight process. In addition, the POB’s charter
provides that the tri-annual review of the POB’s effectiveness address whether the
annual outreach meeting alleviates the need for an advisory council. The Charter did
not establish an advisory council because it was believed that a combination of
outreach meetings, discussions with SEC staff, and meetings of the POB’s
Coordinating Task Force (all of which took place in 2001) would provide adequate
means of obtaining views and recommendations about the accounting profession’s
self-regulatory programs and the POB’s oversight process. The outreach meetings
also provide a vehicle that helps to achieve the objective of another Panel
recommendation, namely, facilitating meaningful continuing dialogue between the
POB and state boards of accountancy.

The POB staff believes that its Charter substantially complies with the spirit of the Panel’s
recommendations for the Charter. However, SEC Chairman Pitt’s proposal for a Public
Accountability Board that would supersede the POB, was one of the reasons which led to the
POB’s decision to terminate its existence, renders academic both the POB’s Charter and any
differences between the Charter and the Panel’s recommendations.
The Panel also recommended that the AICPA provide and allocate additional resources to the
ASB, SECPS, and QCIC staffs. The AICPA has stated that it has provided and is committed to
providing the financial and human resources necessary to meet its mandates and to assist in
protecting the public interest.
In addition, the Panel recommended that the SECPS Executive Committee continue to approve
the members of its constituent committees (QCIC, PRC, and SEC Regulations Committee, and
the Professional Issues Task Force that issues periodic “Practice Alerts” to auditors of SEC
registrants) and that these committees continue to report to the Executive Committee. These
approvals and reporting relationships continue in effect.
Improving Audit Effectiveness Globally
The Panel recommended that the self-regulatory structure of the international auditing profession
include the creation of a global oversight body that would monitor and report on the activities of
the self-regulatory organizations of individual countries. That body should ensure that IFAC
imposes on its member organizations minimum guidelines for the self-regulation of the auditing
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profession in each country. The Panel’s report also included recommendations on the
governance, structure, and responsibilities of the global oversight body.
A global oversight body – the International Public Oversight Board (IPOB) – is being organized.
The seven-member board that is being assembled will include representatives from IFAC, the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and leading monetary and
lending agencies. Early drafts of the IPOB’s charter have been modeled after the U.S. POB’s
new charter.
The IPOB’s responsibilities will include oversight of international quality control standards and
the progress of individual countries’ self-regulatory organizations in promoting external quality
reviews and reporting on their results. A global peer review process, to be monitored by the
IPOB, is in the formative stages, with implementation anticipated within approximately five
years. An international QCIC-type process also is under consideration.
The global self-regulatory structure proposed by the Panel included a body composed of audit
firms – which currently refers to itself as the Forum of Firms (FOF) – that would work with
IFAC to raise international standards and provide funding for the IPOB. The FOF, consisting of
the five largest and most other sizable transnational audit firms, has been formed, and its
constitution and operating policies were approved by IFAC in April 2001.
Improving the Disciplinary Process
The Panel recommended that QCIC should enhance its disciplinary process when it decides, after
studying a case involving an alleged audit failure, to refer the matter to the PEEC because there
may be engagement personnel issues of significance or because QCIC believes PEEC should
open an investigation of certain engagement personnel. In those situations PEEC informs the
firm involved that PEEC’s consideration of the matter is being deferred in accordance with the
Ethics Division’s policy, pending the termination/completion of the litigation or public
regulatory investigation, or the end of the threat of litigation. In order to protect the public in
these situations, the Panel recommended that the firm be required to select one of three options,
if it had not already done so, regarding the engagement partner (or other engagement personnel
in some instances) during the period of deferral, if the partner was still with the firm:
•

Terminate or retire the partner.

•

Remove the partner from all public company audit engagements until the Ethics
Division’s process is completed.

•

Perform an additional second partner review of all public company audit engagements
completed by the partner in the 12 months prior to the deferral and subject the partner to
additional oversight on all public company audit engagements for at least one year.

17

The QCIC promptly adopted this recommendation and the SECPS adopted a membership
requirement, “Procedures in Connection with an Alleged Audit Failure,” that is consistent with
the Panel’s recommendation.
QCIC also has adopted the Panel’s other recommendations to it regarding:
•

Providing the ASB with information on its findings with respect to litigation involving
fraud and with its views on the detection of fraud as the ASB was developing its
proposed new SAS.

•

Initiating ongoing reviews with the ASB, PEEC, and PRC regarding factors that appear
to be influencing audit performance.

•

Enhancing its access to industry specialists and experts with whom it can consult as
necessary during its consideration of cases.

The Panel also recommended that the SEC allocate additional resources to enforcement
activities, recognizing the budgetary constraints under which the SEC operates. In 2000 the SEC
took several “first steps” to target financial fraud and audit failures, including increasing the
number of accountants in enforcement activities and creating a Financial Fraud Task Force for
accelerated investigations of major cases of fraud.
The Panel noted that the SEC’s enforcement releases provide useful lessons, and recommended
that the SEC periodically analyze them and publish the results. The Commission has noted its
limited resources and stated its doubts about the marginal benefits of staff analyses, given that
other organizations study the enforcement releases. The Panel also suggested that the SEC
document information about the auditor’s work when misstatements occur, even if the auditor is
not named in the release. The SEC indicated that it does, and will continue to, document the role
of auditors in financial frauds.
Accounting Issues
The Panel recommended that the FASB add three accounting issues to its agenda: revenue
recognition, estimates and judgments, and going concern considerations.
The Panel believed that an authoritative standard on the broad principles of revenue recognition
was needed. More recently, the SEC also has suggested that the FASB consider a similar project.
In January 2002, the FASB issued a request for comments on a proposal to undertake a project
related to the recognition of revenues and liabilities.
The Panel also noted issues surrounding the accounting for contingent liabilities and other
estimated expenses and losses. The Panel noted that the existing literature offers little
clarification on when the intent of management can result in an asset having been impaired or a
liability having been created. Accordingly, the Panel recommended that the FASB clarify the
accounting for contingencies to enable more consistent application of the criteria for accruing
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losses. The FASB has not added a project that would respond to this recommendation to its
agenda. The FASB noted, however, the existence of certain projects of the FASB and the EITF
related to impairments and liabilities in a business combination. The proposed project on revenue
and liabilities also may address aspects of the Panel’s recommendation.
An auditor is required to assess an entity’s viability and the related disclosures. The Panel noted,
however, that accounting standards do not address definitional and disclosure issues related to
whether an entity can continue as a going concern. Accordingly, it recommended that the FASB
define the going concern concept (clarifying that management, not the auditor, has the primary
responsibility to assess viability) and promulgate disclosure requirements. The FASB has
discussed the Panel’s recommendation with the AICPA but has not determined to take any action
on it.
Audit Committees
The Panel noted that a strong, independent audit committee is an increasingly important element
in corporate governance. The Panel had several suggestions for audit committees, addressing
communications with auditors, internal control, fraud deterrence and detection, estimates and
judgments, and auditors’ performance of non-audit services.
The more significant recommendations were that audit committees should:
•

Devote more time and attention to internal control discussions with management and both
internal and external auditors.

•

Evaluate the nature of their companies’ various reserves and review reserve activity with
management and auditors.

•

Specify that the auditor is accountable to the board and audit committee.

•

Inquire about time pressures on auditors.

•

Ensure that their agenda focuses on, among other things, significant risks, key controls,
interim financial data, management policies and practices for communications with
analysts, and qualitative aspects of financial reporting.

•

Require that management and the auditor advise the committee of any plans on the part
of the client to employ audit firm personnel.

•

Request management to report on the control environment and how it serves to deter and
detect fraud.

•

Pre-approve non-audit services that exceed a threshold determined by the committee.
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Some organizations (such as the Financial Executives International) drew their members’
attention to the Panel’s report. Also, the SEC Chairman sent a letter in January 2001 to the audit
committee chairmen of the largest 5,000 public companies, citing the Panel’s guidance that audit
committees could use to determine the appropriateness of non-audit services performed by the
company’s auditor. He encouraged audit committees to consider that guidance in their
discussions with auditors.
The POB has no effective way to determine the extent to which audit committees have studied or
acted on the Panel’s recommendations. The POB staff believes that recent events have made the
Panel’s recommendations in this area all the more relevant and urges all boards of directors and
their audit committees to consider them.
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The following pages contain all recommendations in the Panel report,
sorted by addressee, and the status of responses as of February 15, 2002.
Each recommendation includes the paragraph number to indicate its
location in the Panel Report.

Recommendations

Status

Auditing Standards Board
2.23 Many of the Panel’s recommendations to the ASB in specific areas
suggest the need to examine existing auditing standards critically, with the
objective of revising or replacing some or all of them with more specific and
definitive guidance containing imperatives to guide auditors in formulating their
judgments and carrying out their work. (Some of the recommendations to the
ASB seek to make its quality control standards similarly more specific and
definitive.) In so doing, the ASB should not pay blind homage to the current
audit risk model when there are more useful or practical alternative
approaches.

General charge to the ASB that should be kept in mind
as “a mission statement” message for the development
of new auditing standards.

2.24 A call for standards that provide specific and definitive guidance is not a
call for standards that diminish or remove the need for auditor judgment. Nor is
it a call for standards that incorporate detailed checklists of auditing
procedures. A good example of an existing standard that the Panel believes
contains a specific and definitive imperative is found in the section of SAS No.
67, The Confirmation Process, titled “Confirmation of Accounts Receivable.”
In fact, a number of the Panel’s recommendations call for auditors to make
explicit judgments in areas where they may not always be doing so.

General charge to the ASB that should be kept in mind
as “a mission statement” message for the development
of new auditing standards.

2.25 By observing that the ASB need not adhere to the current audit risk
model, the Panel implicitly recognizes the potential for changes to that model
to promote audit effectiveness and meet the ever-changing needs of the
auditing profession. The ASB should not feel constrained to follow a model
that is inflexible and incapable of being adapted to meet emerging needs or
new business conditions. For now, however, the Panel’s evaluation of the
audit risk model essentially supports its continuation, as enhanced and
updated by the Panel’s recommendations.

General charge to the ASB that should be kept in mind
as “a mission statement” message for the development
of new auditing standards.

2.26 A major objective of auditing standards should be to help audits serve not
only to detect material fraud but also, by being perceived as rigorous, to deter
fraud from occurring in the first place. Toward that end, the Panel
recommends that auditing standards require auditors to possess a far deeper
understanding of the entity’s business processes, risks and controls, and that
substantive tests with the principal objective of detecting material financial
statement fraud be designed and performed on all audits.

General charge to the ASB that should be kept in mind
as “a mission statement” message for the development
of new auditing standards.

2.27 The Panel believes that the ASB, with its access to staff and volunteer
resources with information technology expertise and its contacts with the
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academic community, could act as a catalyst for identifying how technology
might facilitate and improve the audit process. Research efforts in partnership
with audit firms and academia might lead to breakthrough ideas that could
benefit the auditing profession. The Panel encourages the ASB to pursue this
suggestion.

General charge to the ASB that should be kept in mind
as “a mission statement” message for the development
of new auditing standards.

Assessing inherent risk

The task force is currently addressing these
recommendations. The ASB’s expectations are to
vote out an exposure draft in the fall of 2002. The
revised standards will require the auditors to:

2.48 The Panel recommends that the ASB:
Require the auditor to make inherent risk assessments for significant
account balances and classes of transactions by considering what could go
wrong at the individual assertion level
No longer permit the auditor to default to assessing inherent risk at the
maximum for efficiency or other reasons without considering what could go
wrong in specific financial statement assertions
Provide additional guidance regarding the factors that affect inherent
risk, including the entity’s business processes and risks, and the depth of the
auditor’s understanding of those factors
Indicate the depth of auditor knowledge and the nature of activities or
procedures (and provide some examples of such activities or procedures) that
the auditor might perform to support assessing inherent risk (at both the
financial statement and account or class of transactions levels) below the
maximum

Multi-location audits
2.57 The Panel recommends that the ASB:
Develop more specific and definitive standards for multi-location audits
to cover such matters as:
How the auditor’s consideration of the control environment (taken
alone or in combination with other factors) should influence the selection of
locations to be covered or the way procedures are to be carried out
The extent of knowledge and involvement needed by the auditor with
final responsibility for decisions about the locations and the key personnel
assigned to perform the work at them
Criteria (including materiality considerations) for periodically rotating
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Make risk assessments for significant account
balances and classes of transactions.
Eliminate the ability to default to maximum
inherent risk assessment.
Expand the range and depth of information that
the auditor should understand about the entity and its
environment, including its internal control, as part of
the basis for assessing the risks of material
misstatements to the financial statements.
Provide guidance regarding factors that affect
the risks of material misstatement.
Require the auditor to support the risk
assessment.

The ASB has assigned an AITF member to work with
the IAPC Subcommittee, which is working on this
topic. While technically not an official member of the
IAPC subcommittee, the AITF member will have an
opportunity to participate in discussion and to debate
the issues. As the IAPC work develops, the AIFT will
evaluate how to incorporate such guidance into U.S.
GAAS and what changes, if any, need to be made to
a U.S. standard to be responsive to the
recommendations.
The IAPC subcommittee has met once and was

the coverage of smaller locations
Reliance on internal auditors for coverage of various locations
Methods of establishing materiality at different locations
The scope of work to be performed at different sizes and types of
locations
Emphasize in its guidance that accounting systems, controls, personnel
and other circumstances can vary widely from location to location within an
entity, and that these variations should be considered explicitly in decisions
about how many and which locations to visit and the nature, timing and extent
of work to be performed at each of them. The guidance also should recognize
that analytical procedures may be useful in helping to select the locations to
be visited, especially when there are many rather homogeneous locations.

Assessing control risk
2.77 The Panel recommends that the ASB:
Provide more specific guidance on:
The required depth of auditor knowledge and understanding about
internal control
Whether and to what extent auditors may rely on their assessments
of the effectiveness of the control environment (including corporate
governance) and management’s high-level monitoring of the business to
support control risk assessments below the maximum
The nature and extent of documentation needed, particularly to
support the auditor’s consideration of internal control in planning the audit and
in assessing control risk
The circumstances, if any, in which auditors may rely entirely on
detailed audit tests with either no reliance on controls or reliance only at the
control environment level
Identifying and focusing on key controls for the purpose of
determining what could go wrong and what controls to test
Linking the “components of internal control,” including transactionlevel controls, with identified risks and detailed audit tests
The nature, timing and extent of controls testing in varying
circumstances
The circumstances, if any, permitting rotating tests of controls over
two or more years in areas in which the auditor intends to rely on controls
The circumstances, if any, in which tests of controls also may
constitute substantive tests (dual purpose tests)
The necessary level of testing of management reports and other
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expected to meet again in March 2002, at which time
it is expected to make known its significant issues
and preliminary conclusions.

Some of these recommendations were addressed in
SAS No. 94 (see below), such as the fourth subbullet.
The Joint Risk Assessments Task Force is reviewing
the auditor’s consideration of the risk assessment
process, including the necessary understanding of the
entity and its environment, the entity’s response to
risk, and how the auditor should use the risk
assessment to determine the auditing procedures to
be performed.
A more robust understanding of the entity and the
risks of material misstatements to the financial
statements will be required. Specific categories for
understanding are expected to include:
Nature of the entity;
Industry, regulatory and other external factors
including accounting policies;
Objectives and strategies and related business
risks, as well as the entity’s own risk assessment
process;
Measurement and monitoring of the entity’s
performance; and
Internal control including the control

internal data sources used by the auditor in performing analytical procedures
or other audit tests
Indicate the importance of having personnel with significant audit and
industry experience participate in performing internal control work, particularly
at the planning stage

environment, the information system relevant to
financial reporting and relating business processes,
control procedures, and monitoring of controls.
The task force is considering each of these bullet
points. Additionally, as part of developing the new
standard(s), the task force will consider and specificy
documentation requirements.
An exposure draft is expected in the Fall 2002.

Give priority to completing the work of the ASB technology task force
that was formed to consider the manner in which auditing standards taken as
a whole appropriately reflect the use and impact of information technology and
whether changes should be made to auditing standards
Linking the risk assessments to substantive tests
2.106 The Panel recommends that the ASB:
Linkage
Develop more definitive authoritative guidance on linking the nature, timing
and extent of substantive tests to risk assessments, including guidance aimed
at the nature of procedures and at reducing the incidence of inadequate
sample sizes and variations in sample sizes in similar circumstances.
Substantive Tests
Articulate more precisely the considerations that should be present to
overcome the presumption that it is necessary to send confirmations.
Undertake research to develop more effective methods of confirmation or
other means of obtaining evidence from third parties, such as through the use
of technology.
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SAS No. 94 approved by ASB in April 2001.

The Joint Risk Assessments Task Force is working on a
project, the expected output of which will be a new
standard(s) that will provide guidance to auditors linking
the auditor’s risk assessment to the nature, timing and
extent of auditing procedures.
An exposure draft is expected in the Fall 2002.
While the task force is addressing the second bullet, it
has not yet determined whether it is necessary to
conduct research to achieve the objectives of the last
bullet of the recommendation.
Note: This is a joint ASB/IAPC task force. The “Linkage”
task force (which was recently combined into the Joint
Risk Assessments Task Force) met a few times but dealt
only with peripheral matters. It has yet to get to the crux
of the project, namely guidance for linking the assessed
levels of risk to the nature, timing and extent of
procedures performed. The original plan was the
products of the three task forces (risk assessments, fraud
and tests of assertions) would be exposed together as a
package of amendments to codify and amend the
fieldwork standards. However, risk assessment and

linkage have been delayed, and the current plan is to
attempt to complete the fraud standard in advance of the
others.
Analytical procedures
2.123 The Panel recommends that the ASB:
Enhance auditing standards for analytical procedures to provide more
specificity about what auditors need to do to design and perform analytical
procedures in differing circumstances. The auditing standards should:
Provide guidance on how to design substantive analytical
procedures for different types of accounts and assertions
Clearly articulate how relevant auditing concepts (e.g., the concepts
of planning materiality, control risk assessment and testing of controls, and
desired levels of assurance) influence the design and performance of
analytical procedures
Provide guidance on linking analytical procedures in the overall
review stage to the auditor’s conclusions reached in the audit and the
sufficiency of the audit evidence that supports those conclusions
Develop more guidance on when it is appropriate (and when it is
inappropriate) for the auditor to rely on management’s explanations during the
course of the audit and on obtaining additional evidence to corroborate those
explanations

The ASB’s Analytical Procedures Audit Guide Working
Group has revised and updated the prior Analytical
Procedures Audit Practice Study (APS). This
document has been upgraded to an Audit Guide,
Analytical Procedures. The document was published
in September 2001.
The task force is currently working on a project, the
expected output of which will be a new standard(s) that
will provided guidance to auditors, linking various risk
assessment processes to the nature, timing and extent of
auditing procedures.
Reliance on management’s expectations and the need to
corroborate those explanations have been addressed in
the Analytical Procedures Audit Guide and will further be
addressed in the linkage process.
Additionally, the fraud exposure draft will have a section
dealing with evaluating whether analytical procedures
performed as substantives tests or in the overall review
stage of the audit indicate a previously unrecognized risk
of material misstatement due to fraud.
Amendment to SAS No. 56 included in SAS 96, Audit
Documentation, issued in January 2002, addresses
this recommendation.

Specify appropriate documentation requirements

Auditing revenue
2.139 The Panel recommends that the ASB:
Require that auditors test the cutoff of revenue when inherent or control
risks relating to such transactions are other than low and specifically when
there is a high level of sales transactions or individually significant sales
transactions near the end of the reporting period. Cutoff tests should be more
extensive than tests of only a few transactions before and after the close of the
period. Cutoff testing often should require the auditor’s physical presence at
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Cutoff and confirmation issues have been addressed
in the Auditing Revenues in Certain Industries Guide,
issued in June 2001. However, a specific
requirement to test the cut-off of revenue is not
included in the guide.

the entity’s location(s) at period end.
Clarify its standard on the confirmation process (SAS No. 67) to address
the circumstances in which confirmation of the terms of transactions should be
required. The terms of revenue transactions should be confirmed whenever
the transactions are individually significant and the risks associated with
revenue recognition or the existence of receivables is high. This might be
appropriate even if the auditor believes that confirmation of balances is
ineffective.

Give the highest priority to completing its proposed audit guide for
revenue recognition

Auditing estimates and judgments
2.160 The Panel recommends that the ASB:
Provide detailed guidance regarding the auditing of reserves. The Panel
understands that the ASB intends to prepare a guide for auditing reserves
along the lines of the Notice to Readers, Audit Issues in Revenue Recognition,
that it issued in 1999. The Panel urges the ASB to assign a high priority to this
effort and provide guidance on what constitutes sufficient evidence to support
reserve balances and activity, including what is needed to corroborate
documentation generated by the entity.
Establish a protocol to assess the auditability of proposed accounting
standards prior to their issuance. Any field tests of proposed standards also
should include evaluations of their auditability. Further, the liaison between the
ASB and the FASB that exists currently should be made formal to help ensure
timely identification of and reaction to audit issues related to accounting
standards.

Materiality, waived adjustments and analysts’ expectations
2.177 The Panel recommends that the ASB:
Provide additional authoritative guidance to assist auditors in
determining whether identified misstatements are material. (The Panel
understands the ASB is considering this subject.)

This issue is also being considered by the Joint Risk
Assessments Task Force in its deliberations regarding
the linking of risk assessments to the design of
auditing procedures.
The ASB has not issued further guidance clarifying the
circumstances in which confirmation of the terms of
transactions should be required, other than to
recommend this procedure in the aforementioned
Audit Guide.
The new Audit Guide, Auditing Revenue in Certain
Industries, was issued in June 2001.

ASB staff guidance in process; expected issuance
date is the Spring of 2002.

Discussions with FASB and AcSec staff have
occurred. A comment letter was issued on
auditability issues related to FASB Proposed ED,

Business Combinations and Intangible Assets -Accounting for Goodwill. The Audit & Attest staff

and ASB will continue to monitor the development of
new accounting standards and will provide input and
comments to accounting standard setters when
auditability issues are identified. However, a formal
protocol has not been established.

Four Auditing Interpretations were issued in October
2000.
The task force is considering analysts’ expectations
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Require the auditor to consider published analysts’ reports and forecasts
(in addition to other information) when gaining an understanding of the entity’s
business and industry, assessing risks and considering whether the effects of
identified misstatements are qualitative material.
Specify, in cooperation with the FASB if necessary, that there be only
one method of handling prior periods’ uncorrected misstatements when
determining whether proposed adjustments are material. (The Panel
understands that this matter is on the ASB’s agenda and recognizes that the
ASB and FASB likely would need to develop an appropriate method of
transitioning to the chosen method.)
Going concern considerations
2.187 The Panel recommends that the ASB provide expanded guidance and
specific examples of the auditing procedures to be performed and the audit
evidence to be obtained when considering management’s plans for mitigating
the adverse effects of conditions and events that raised the auditor’s
substantial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.
Particular consideration should be given to circumstances in which reliance is
placed on proposed cost reductions and other prospective financial
information.

in its deliberations on gaining a proper understanding
to plan and conduct an audit.
After consideration of the issue with all affected
constituencies, the project was suspended. This item
will be discussed with the SEC during the March
liaison meeting. The ASB asserts that they are ready
to draft additional guidance once the accounting
issues are addressed.

Amendment to SAS No. 59 included in SAS No. 96,
Audit Documentation, issued in January 2002
enhances the documentation requirements.
ASB would like to undertake a project to revise SAS
59, but currently believes that such a project would
be more effective after the accounting
recommendations are addressed.
The ASB is revising SAS No. 71, Interim Financial
Information, to update and enhance the guidance on
reviews of interim financial statements. The current
standard has no guidance related to going concern
issues. This project would include those issues, but
the ASB feels handicapped significantly by the lack of
accounting standards in this area. (See status of
recommendation to the FASB at 2.190.)

Internal Auditors
2.199 The Panel recommends that the Auditing Standards Board revise SAS
No. 65 to establish more definitive and specific criteria and requirements for
testing the work performed by internal audit.

AITF has discussed the recommendation and
concluded that the discussion in the Panel report did
not support the recommendation and decided not to
revise the SAS. However, the ASB staff was directed
to update the APS entitled, The Independent Auditor’s

Consideration of the Work of Internal Auditors.

7

Establishing audit standards
2.232 The Panel recommends that the ASB:
GAAS Hierarchy and Access to Guidance
Definitively set forth the “hierarchy” of GAAS, including the authoritative
status of existing AICPA guidance. The SASs should specify the guidance
auditors should use in performing audits, whether that guidance is explicitly in
the SASs or elsewhere.
Ensure distribution and accessibility of ASB pronouncements to all
AICPA members who provide attest services

SAS 95, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, was
issued in December 2001. This standard addresses
the GAAS hierarchy.

Accessibility to all AICPA Professional Standards is
available through CPA2Biz electronically or hard copy.
AICPA professional standards are also available
through PPC’s CD.

Auditing Standards and Quality Control Standards Generally
Review all the standards of fieldwork not addressed elsewhere in this
report for the purpose of ensuring that they are sufficiently specific and
definitive, either within the SASs or elsewhere in the GAAS hierarchy, to guide
auditors in formulating their judgments and carrying out their work. While the
ASB may decide to differentiate between auditing standards applicable to both
non-public and public entities and those applicable only to public entities, in
general the Panel discourages such practice, especially with standards of
fieldwork, since investors might be confused by the varying levels of audit
quality that could result.

This recommendation will be addressed on an ongoing
basis by respective task forces.

Perform a similar review, in collaboration with the Peer Review
Committee and QCIC, of the Statements on Quality Control Standards to
ensure that they also are specific and definitive. (See the Panel’s
recommendations to the SEC Practice Section and the ASB in the section
“Enhancing Peer Reviews” in Chapter 6.)

The Joint Quality Control Standards Task Force is
considering matters related to Statements on Quality
Control Standards (SQCSs) to determine whether
additional standards, amendments, interpretations or
supplementary guidance are needed.
The above task force is also revising the AICPA’s, Guide
for Establishing and Maintaining a System of Quality
Control for a CPA Firm’s Accounting and Auditing
Practice to reflect the two most recent SQCSs and the
recommendations in the Panel report. As a result of this
updating process, recommendations may be made to the
ASB, as appropriate, to amend the SQCS to add more
specificity to the Quality Control standards.
The Joint Quality Control Standards Task Force consists
of representatives of the AICPA’s ASB, the Accounting
and Review Services Committee, the Peer Review
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Board, the Quality Control Inquiry Committee, and the
SEC Practice Section Peer Review Committee.
Materiality
Evaluate the guidance in SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in
Conducting an Audit, on the auditor’s consideration of materiality in planning
the audit and designing audit tests and on how materiality and risk
assessments are related.
As part of this effort, the ASB also should review its auditing standard on
audit sampling, SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling. The ASB’s review should
address whether more definitive guidance in the area of materiality – including
the effects of materiality judgments on decisions about audit emphasis, the
extent of audit testing and sample sizes related to specific objectives – might
lead to more effective audits.
The ASB should request firms to share with it their guidance on
materiality to assist it in its deliberations. The ASB also should consider
appropriate research (possibly with the cooperation of firms, academic
researchers and peer reviewers) on how the materiality concept is applied in
practice.

The Joint Risk Assessment Task Force is considering the
recommendation.

Recommendation considered in revised (and upgraded)
Audit Guide, Audit Sampling. The new guide was
issued in June 2001.

The Panel believes that this effort likely will result in modifications to auditing
standards, unless the ASB is satisfied on the basis of its research that the
present guidance is sufficient to drive effective materiality judgments in
planning the audit and designing audit tests.
Working Papers and Documentation
Enhance SAS No. 41, Working Papers, to include criteria regarding the
minimum documentation working papers should contain. The criteria for
documentation to be included in working papers should be sufficiently specific
to enable reviewers to understand the audit work performed, who performed
and reviewed the work, and the nature of the audit evidence examined.
Provide sufficient guidance in the quality control standards about working
paper documentation to enable firms and peer reviewers to judge the quality of
engagement performance (including the supervision of the work of assistants).
The ASB should link the two sets of working paper standards to each other.
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SAS 96, Audit Documentation, was issued in January
2002 addressing this recommendation.

SAS 96 includes footnotes references to quality
control standards.
Joint Quality Control Task Force is considering the
need for revised guidance to address documentation
issues relating to documenting compliance with QC
policies.

Review all the fieldwork standards to ensure that there is definitive
guidance within the SASs (or elsewhere in the GAAS hierarchy) on the type
and extent of documentation that should be contained in the working papers.
For example, the ASB should consider areas where specific documentation
requirements similar to those contained in SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud
in a Financial Statement Audit, would likely enhance audit effectiveness, and it
should amend or modify the SASs accordingly.

SAS 96, Audit Documentation, includes amendments
to SAS No. 47, 56 and 59. All future task forces will
be instructed to specifically consider documentation
requirements.

2.233 The Panel recommends that, consistent with the POB’s role of oversight
over the ASB’s agenda and processes, the POB review the ASB’s
prioritization, timetable and process for addressing the Panel’s
recommendations to it. In so doing, the POB and the ASB should consider the
following observations and insights offered by the Panel:

The POB has established oversight over the ASB's
agenda and process.

Priorities and Timetable
This chapter and Chapter 3 contain many recommendations to the ASB.
These recommendations have been organized along the same lines as the
QPR, generally tracking the key elements of the audit risk model, but they
have not been assigned priorities. The Panel has expressed the view that its
recommendations to the ASB in Chapter 3 reasonably could be effective
starting with audits of financial statements for periods commencing after
December 31, 2001. Otherwise, it has not endeavored to prioritize its
recommendations or set forth a timetable for their implementation. The Panel
recognizes, however, that its recommendations in some audit areas are
closely linked with those in other areas and require coordination when the ASB
sets priorities and its agenda. The POB should ensure that the
recommendations are addressed in a timely and effective manner.

The POB has established a tracking mechanism for
reporting actions and progress on the Panel's
recommendations and task forces of the ASB are
currently working on Chapter 3 recommendations.

ASB Due Process
The Panel is aware that the ASB follows due process in formulating and
promulgating GAAS and quality control standards, including subjecting its
proposed pronouncements to public exposure and comment. The ASB
process weighs the relative benefits of its proposals with the attendant costs of
implementing them. While respecting the importance of the ASB’s due
process, the Panel expresses confidence that its recommendations to the
ASB, taken as a whole, are both reasonable and capable of implementation in
a cost-effective manner.
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The POB is cognizant of the due process in establishing
GAAS and has closely monitored the due process
followed in formulating and voting on the exposure draft
covering audit documentation. The POB is providing
input and commentary about due process as appropriate.

Research and Innovation
The Panel is aware that current or future research by the academic
community and others may be relevant to matters addressed in its
recommendations to the ASB. Furthermore, the Panel acknowledges that the
ASB will need to adapt GAAS and quality control standards to respond to new
or evolving business conditions and demands on auditors. The Panel has
developed its recommendations to meet both the current needs of investors
for assurances on financial statements required under the present securities
laws and the needs of investors in the reasonably foreseeable future. The
Panel has not attempted, however, to predict the future “state-of-the-art” in
accounting, the quantity or nature of financial and non-financial information
that will be demanded by the marketplace, or how such information might be
disseminated to and assimilated by investors in the longer term. (Chapter 8
contains the Panel’s vision of some issues that pose a challenge in the years
ahead.) Although the Panel believes that the ASB should consider carefully
the results of research and the visions of accounting and auditing futurists, the
ASB should not delay its timely pursuit of the Panel’s recommendations until
the research has been completed and evaluated.
Earnings management and fraud
3.48 The Panel recommends that the ASB develop stronger and more
definitive auditing standards to effect a substantial change in auditors’
performance and thereby improve the likelihood that auditors will detect
fraudulent financial reporting.

3.49 The Panel envisions that the new requirements would be over and above
those that are now contemplated by a GAAS audit. The degree to which these
requirements would require additional audit effort is likely to vary with a
number of factors, such as the size and complexity of the entity’s operations
and the difficulty of applying accounting principles that call for management to
make judgments involving subjective estimates. The additional audit effort also
would be influenced by the auditors’ risk assessments – including their
assessments of management’s motivations (potentially at many levels of an
entity) to manage earnings and meet the expectations of the financial
community or of higher levels of management – and their understanding and
tests of internal control. The Panel believes that the incremental audit effort
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The ASB has commissioned several research proposals
and the POB has requested an inventory and status
report from the ASB on research projects.

Various standards being developed by the ASB will
include, among other things, the following:
Revised approach to assessing risk factors.
Increased inquiry of management and others.
Role of team discussions.
Presumption that certain procedures should be
performed to address risk of management override of
controls.

•

The ASB has not specifically adopted the specific
Panel’s recommendation that a “forensic phase”
be included in all audits. However, in February
2002, the ASB voted to expose a draft of a new
Statement on Auditing Standards. Though the
Exposure Draft does not call for a “forensic-type”
phases, it incorporates many of the Panel’s
specific recommendations. The proposal includes
guidance about:
Engagement personnel discussing the risks of

that would result from this recommendation ordinarily would neither constitute
a dominant part of the audit nor be inconsequential. Under “Consideration of
Exposure Draft Comments on the Forensic-type Phase” at the end of this
chapter, the Panel provides the ASB with its observations on factors that
ordinarily would influence how much additional audit effort would be required.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

3.50 The Panel further believes it is reasonable that the strengthened
standards be effective starting with audits of financial statements for periods
commencing after December 31, 2001.

material misstatement due to fraud.
Expanding inquiries of entity personnel
regarding the risk of fraud.
Identifying risks that may result in a material
misstatement due to fraud.
Evaluating the entity’s programs and controls
that address the identified risks.
Planning and performing procedures that
respond to the identified risks.
Planning and performing procedures that
further address the risk of management override
of controls.
Evaluating audit test results.
Communicating conclusions about fraud to
management, the audit committee, and others.
Documenting the auditor’s consideration of
fraud.
The 2001 date will not be met.

3.51 To implement the foregoing recommendation, the Panel recommends
that the ASB require the following in all audits:

Planning and Supervision
Discussion by supervisory engagement personnel (including the auditor
with final authority, usually the engagement partner) with other engagement
team members about the vulnerability of the entity to fraud.
This discussion should encompass what is expected of team members in
dealing with a potential for fraud in the specific areas of the audit assigned to
them. An important objective of these discussions would be to identify the
appropriate engagement team members to address the potential for fraud
(e.g., the engagement team members who should interview company
personnel) and how their work is to be supervised and reviewed.
This recommendation requires a significant strengthening of the first standard
of fieldwork that “the work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any,
are to be properly supervised.” The objective of a strengthened standard is to
ensure a substantive dialogue among members of an engagement team about
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According to the ASB, The Fraud Task Force has
considered all of the Panel’s Chapter 3
recommendations as part of its deliberations. At the
February 2002 ASB meeting, the ASB approved the
Exposure Draft, referred to in 3.49 above, that it
believes is responsive to the Panel’s
recommendations. The ASB intends to issue a final
standard by the end of 2002 effective for periods
beginning on or after December 15, 2002.

“what could go wrong” and “how fraud might be perpetrated.” This dialogue
should guide how engagement team members address the possibility of fraud,
including how procedures (including inquiries) might be designed to address
that possibility. The strengthened standard should be sufficiently specific that
these activities are carried out by engagement teams (and thus involve
engagement partners) at all significant locations. The engagement team
members to be involved in this dialogue should include information technology
and other specialists assigned to the audit. Decisions about the actions to be
taken by individual engagement team members should be documented.
Forensic-type Fieldwork Phase
Introduction of a “forensic-type fieldwork phase”. Not unlike the traditional
planning, interim, final and review phases of audits, this new forensic-type
phase should become an integral part of the audit, with careful thought given
to how and when it is to be carried out. A forensic-type fieldwork phase does
not mean converting a GAAS audit to a “fraud audit.” Rather, the
characterization of this phase of a GAAS audit as a forensic-type phase seeks
to convey an attitudinal shift in the auditor’s degree of skepticism.
Furthermore, use of the word phase does not mean that the work cannot be
integrated throughout the audit.
During this phase, auditors should modify the otherwise neutral concept of
professional skepticism and presume the possibility of dishonesty at various
levels of management, including collusion, override of internal control and
falsification of documents. The key question that auditors should ask is
“Where is the entity vulnerable to financial statement fraud if management
were inclined to perpetrate it?”
Auditing standards should require in this phase:
Performance of substantive tests directed at the possibility of fraud,
including tests to detect the override of internal control by management
(recognizing that management includes many levels of personnel in an entity,
including personnel outside of the United States, and not just top corporatelevel management). The nature, timing and extent of such tests should be
guided (at a minimum) by the following criteria.
Tests should be centered around the balance sheet date for balance
sheet accounts and throughout the year (including the latest quarter) for
income statement accounts, in the following areas (some of which may
overlap):
High-risk areas (at the specific account and assertion level) identified
by the engagement team as areas where the opportunity to perpetrate fraud is
higher than normal. Candidates for such identification would include balance
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The revised fraud standard Exposure Draft does not
specifically mention a “forensic fieldwork stage” the
task force and ASB believe the exposure draft
responds to the spirit of these recommendations.
The proposed statement increases the focus on
professional skepticism including (a) the discussion of
its importance in engagement team planning meetings
and (b) its effect as it relates to the gathering and
evaluation of evidential matter when fraud risks are
identified.

The proposed statement implements this
recommendation by specifying selected substantive
procedures that would be “…appropriate for every
audit – absent a conclusion by the auditor that, in the
particular circumstances, their performance is
unnecessary.” The proposed statement provides
examples of circumstances involving audits of
nonpublic entities that might overcome the need to
perform the procedures, and indicates that in a public
entity audit the procedures should always be
performed.

sheet or income statement accounts affected by revenue recognition policies,
deferred costs, asset additions resulting from complex transactions such as
business combinations accounted for as purchases, reserves that are highly
dependent on management’s intentions or representations, accounts (or
elements of them) not subject to systems-driven controls, and related party
transactions.
Areas for which Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20 requires
disclosure of significant accounting policies
Material balance sheet accounts that generally “turn over” several
times throughout the year (e.g., trade receivables, inventory, payables, cash
and securities)
Non-standard entries (including entries made to computer records)
requiring management’s involvement or approval. (The ASB should define the
term non-standard entries for this purpose).
Auditors should consider incorporating a surprise or unpredictability
element in their tests. Examples of what they should consider include the
following:
Recounts of inventory items or unannounced visits to locations
Interviews of financial and non-financial company personnel in
different areas or locations. Interviews of company information technology
personnel may be appropriate to inquire about possible overrides of computerrelated controls. Inquiries of company personnel (including legal personnel)
responsible for addressing reports by company employees or others alleging
irregularities also should be made. (For example, some companies have
employee “hot lines” that enable confidential reporting of possible
improprieties or violations of company policies.)
Requests for written confirmations from company employees
regarding matters about which they have made representations to the auditors
Requests for written confirmations from customers or vendors that
otherwise would not be undertaken and that are carefully tailored to address
the nature and specific terms of the underlying transactions, for example, to
assist in identifying “side agreements” allowing a right of return or other
concessions
Tests of accounts not ordinarily performed annually
Tests of accounts traditionally or frequently deemed “low risk”
The tests should be either tests of details or precise substantive
analytical procedures, but not tests of controls. (Tests of controls may not be
effective in detecting fraud because management can override controls.)
The external auditor should not use the work of internal auditors in
carrying out tests directed at the possibility of fraud. The internal auditors may
provide limited direct assistance to the external auditor, and may perform
similar procedures to supplement the work of the external auditor.
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The substantive tests proposed to address this
management override issue would be:
Examining journal entries.
Reviewing accounting estimates for bias,
including a retrospective analysis.
Evaluation the business rationale for significant
unusual transactions.

Use of technologically advanced auditing tools should be
encouraged.
Non-corporate and non-U.S. locations should be covered by
substantive tests directed at the possibility of fraud. Some rotation over a
reasonable number of audit periods would be acceptable.
Re-review by supervisory audit personnel, at the conclusion of the audit,
of high-risk areas to reassess whether conditions identified during fieldwork or
test results (e.g., exceptions and related explanations by entity personnel)
might call for additional tests.

Retrospective Audit Procedures
Introduction of retrospective audit procedures, calling for an analysis of
selected opening balance sheet accounts of previously audited financial
statements. The accounts should be selected using risk-based or other criteria
specified by the ASB. The ASB also should provide guidance on the types of
tests to be applied to the accounts. The objective of the audit tests should be
to assess how certain issues involving accounting estimates and judgments,
for example, an allowance for sales returns, were resolved with the benefit of
hindsight. This retrospective look at and testing of accounts that previously
had been audited is intended to act as a fraud deterrent by posing a threat to
the successful concealment of fraud, not to second-guess reasonable
judgments based on information available at the time the financial statements
were originally issued. Consequently, the auditor should modify the otherwise
“neutral” concept of professional skepticism, as discussed above.
Review and Documentation
Debriefing of engagement team members assigned to perform
retrospective procedures and procedures during the forensic-type phase by
supervisory personnel, and assessing the propriety of follow-up actions and
conclusions reached, both of which should be documented.
Specific documentation relating to the retrospective procedures and the
procedures carried out during the forensic-type phase of the audit, including
the results of the assessments made.
Procedural Guidance for Interim Periods
Include in its standards specific guidance for the application of
procedures in interim periods using a forensic-type approach equivalent to that
described above. In this connection, the Panel believes that the ASB should
consider the observations in the 1999 COSO Report that many frauds are

15

The proposed fraud Exposure Draft significantly extends
documentation requirements – requiring documentation
supporting compliance with substantially all the major
requirements of the statement.

The SAS 71 Task Force is considering the need to
provide revised guidance dealing with the performance
of interim procedures.

initiated in interim periods.
Provide criteria for the areas that should be addressed in reviews of
interim financial information. Such criteria might include, for example, areas
involving a high degree of subjectivity (e.g., merger-related or restructuring
reserves), areas involving complex accounting standards (e.g., software
revenue recognition), related party transactions and areas where controls are
particularly susceptible to being overridden (e.g., sales cut-off).
Provide guidance on how procedures employed in interim periods that
address the potential for fraud in financial reporting also may be useful as
“continuous auditing” techniques to improve full-year audits. The Panel
understands the need to separate auditors’ responsibilities in an audit of
financial statements from those in a limited review of interim financial
information. However, it encourages the ASB to research and address
concepts of continuous auditing in furtherance of a more effective audit model.
Enhancing peer reviews
6.42 The Panel recommends that the ASB, in collaboration with the Peer
Review Committee and QCIC, review the quality control standards and make
them more specific and definitive for firms with public clients, especially for the
largest firms. The Panel also recommends that the three groups establish a
mechanism for ongoing monitoring of the standards to keep them current.
(See the Panel’s recommendations to the ASB on Auditing Standards and
Quality Control Standards Generally in the section in Chapter 2 on
“Establishing Auditing Standards.”)

The Task Force is considering the nature and extent
of procedures that might be applied on an interim
basis to detect fraud and how such procedures would
fit into the audit risk model. Further the Task Force
hopes to present a discussion draft to the ASB at its
April 2002 meeting.
The proposed statement provides a discussion of
when an auditor might elect to apply substantive tests
to transactions occurring earlier in or throughout the
reporting period.

The Quality Control Task Force is considering the
specificity of the standards as well as the nonauthoritative Quality Control Guide.
Although there are frequent contacts between the staff
and the committee members, the staff Directors began a
formal process in the Spring of 2001 to meet quarterly to
discuss common projects, issues and where applicable,
ideas with respect to changes in standards or guidance.
Additionally, AITF will begin a formal liaison with QCIC
and has scheduled its first meeting for May 8, 2002.

International
7.48 The Panel recommends that the ASB and IAPC initiate a formal
collaborative effort to harmonize auditing standards and achieve their global
acceptance. Others interested in auditing standard setting should be invited to
participate in this effort.
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ASB and IAPC have initiated some joint activities:
The Joint Risk Assessments Task Force is a true joint
task force, intended to result in a common document.
Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures is
an IAPC exposure draft, for which the ASB issued an
Invitation to Comment. The intent is to solicit U.S.
comments that will be used to influence the IAPC
document so that once issued, its quality will be such that
it will be the basis for a new SAS to be exposed in the
Spring of 2002.

IAPC is an observer at the ASB fraud task force.
ASB is an observer at one IAPC task force on group
audits.
An ASB staff member attends all IAPC meetings (and
certain task force meetings) and serves as a technical
adviser to the US representative on IAPC.
IFAC staff usually attends ASB meetings and some
task force meetings.
There are frequent staff and chair contacts, as well as
with counterparts in the UK and Canada.
7.49 While the Panel encourages this initiative, it also believes that such an
effort should be conducted in parallel with the ASB’s consideration of its other
recommendations. (See the Panel’s recommendation to the POB and the ASB
under “Establishing Auditing Standards” in Chapter 2.)

ASB continues to consider Panel recommendations while
it works towards convergence of U.S. and International
Auditing Standards.

Audit Firms
2.28 Many of the Panel’s recommendations in specific areas suggest that
audit firms need to undertake substantive efforts to reestablish the importance
of the role of independent auditors within their organizations and thereby
reinvigorate their audit practices. They should provide guidance to their audit
personnel that is specific and definitive and should focus more on training
audit personnel in the methodologies that support their audit practices
(including how to both use technology and audit their clients’ use of it). Audit
firms should embed intolerance for audit failures in their cultures. The concept
of professional skepticism should be taught effectively and the role of auditors
in the detection, and implicitly in the deterrence, of fraud reinforced.

The POB staff received responses from the eight largest
firms, as well as two other firms. The firm’s responses
generally were extensive and provided sufficient details
about the activities in implementing the Panel
recommendations. Overall, the firms appear to have
been responsive to the recommendations or believe they
previously implemented the substance of the
recommendation.

2.29 Definitive professional standards and well-conceived firm policies,
procedures, guidance materials, practice aids and audit training programs
must be accompanied by a strong commitment by the audit firms to make
continuous improvements in their processes and strive to meet the goal of
“zero defects.” The firms’ leaders should convey a tone of high
professionalism as the principal message to their auditors and should develop
systems for incentives, compensatory rewards and penalties, and promotions
that not only mirror the tone but also make it a reality.

The majority of the responding firms have adapted the
management tone and goal of “zero defects”. In a
number of instances, the firms’ professional guidance
was enhanced as a result of the Panel
recommendations.
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Assessing engagement risk
2.39 The Panel recommends that audit firms consider adopting sophisticated,
computerized systems for identifying engagement risk that involve both
quantitative and qualitative factors, including a search for potentially
derogatory or other information about the entity and its principal owners and
officers, and integrating those systems into their audits. A cooperative effort
by the firms to share best practices should facilitate implementing this
recommendation.

Most of the responding firms have adopted or previously
developed an automated engagement risk model. One
firm reported using a tool that informs engagement teams
of significant stock movements, litigation and negative
analysts commentaries of their clients.

Assessing inherent risk
2.49 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Review and ascertain whether they need to augment their policies and
guidance on assessing inherent risk, for example, to cover the types of
matters described in the recommendations to the ASB

Many of the responding firms believe their existing
policies are adequately documented. In several
instances, the firm clarified their guidance on assessing
inherent risk.

Require that a partner be actively involved in making inherent risk
assessments at both the overall financial statement level and the assertion
level for significant account balances and classes of transactions

The responding firms have a QC requirement that
mandates the engagement partner be involved in
engagement risk assessment activities, such as
assessing inherent risk.

Require that the inherent risk assessments for high-risk clients be
reviewed by the concurring partner or an industry expert before the related
tests of controls and substantive tests are designed and performed

There are many diverse polices and procedures for
complying with this recommendation. All of the
responding firms have some requirement of the
involvement of a concurring review partner or an industry
leader in the planning for a high-risk engagement.
Engrained in the planning is the explicit or implicit
requirement to concur with the assessment of inherent
risk.
The majority of the firms have enhanced their existing
training to incorporate “real-life” case studies.

Review their training materials on assessing inherent risk and ascertain
whether they need to be augmented, in terms of either the time devoted to the
subject or the materials used, such as by “real-life” case studies on assessing
inherent risk. The training should reinforce the need for every engagement
team to take the necessary time to gain a thorough understanding of the
entity’s business and industry and do a thorough job of assessing inherent
risk, at both the overall financial statement level and the assertion level for
significant account balances and classes of transactions.
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Assessing control risk
2.78 The Panel recommends that audit firms place a high priority on
enhancing the overall effectiveness of auditors’ work on internal control,
particularly with respect to the depth and substance of their knowledge about
companies’ information systems. The following areas should be addressed:
Audit practice – Firms of all sizes should examine critically their audit
work on internal control. In many situations, firms should increase the
engagement time allotted to internal control, particularly in the audit planning
phase. They also should raise the level of involvement by more experienced
audit personnel. Audit personnel who supervise engagements should be
directed to focus on increasing the engagement team’s knowledge of
important information systems and controls. They should focus particularly on
(1) obtaining a more thorough understanding of information systems relevant
to financial reporting and the related risks and controls, (2) identifying and
evaluating the design of key controls, (3) linking controls with identified risks
and substantive audit tests, (4) designing tests of the operating effectiveness
of controls, (5) considering the results of the tests of controls, and (6)
considering how decisions about the nature, timing and extent of controls
testing affected audit effectiveness.
Professional development – Training programs should place greater
emphasis on each of the components of internal control as well as on
assessing and testing controls. The objective should be to increase
significantly the overall effectiveness of auditors in identifying and responding
to risks, key controls and control deficiencies in the control environment and
information systems.
Information technology – The Panel sees an increasing need for auditors
to have a higher level of technology skills and for more effective participation
in audits by information technology specialists. Their participation should
include assessing the risk that erroneous information may affect the financial
statements, assessing the adequacy of controls and designing tests of their
operating effectiveness. Firms should develop specific training materials and
programs to make auditors more knowledgeable about information technology,
and information technology specialists more knowledgeable about auditing.
Information technology specialists should be integrated more effectively and
consistently into the audit process. There should be joint training of auditors
and specialists, starting at the partner and manager levels. Firms without such
specialized capabilities should develop appropriate cooperative arrangements
to ensure that information technology risks and controls are fully addressed in
the audit.
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All of the firms responded to this recommendation
positively. The firms appear to be sensitive to the linkage
between the assessments of internal control risk, and the
results of related control tests, to other audit procedures.

Several firms created new training modules for
understanding and evaluating an IT system and how to
integrate the IT risks into the audit activities. Other firms
reported previously addressing this recommendation in
their course curriculum.
All of the firms responded positively to this
recommendation. The most common forms of
implementation included:
Increasing the number of IT specialists in the local
offices.
Redesigning the audit methodology to better stress
the integration of information technology specialists.
Involving the IT professionals in more
engagements.

Inspection programs – Internal inspection programs should increase their
focus on internal control work, the effective involvement of information
technology specialists and the effective involvement of experienced audit
personnel in this area.
Linking the risk assessments to substantive tests
2.107 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Linkage
Review their policies and procedures and guidance materials with
respect to linking risk assessments to the nature, timing and extent of
substantive tests, including designing substantive procedures that address all
assertions where risk is not low, and establishing sample sizes that are large
enough to provide sufficient evidence whenever sampling (as defined in SAS
No. 39) is employed
Review their training materials with respect to linkage and sampling and
ascertain whether they need to be augmented, with respect to either the time
devoted to the subjects or the materials used, such as by developing “real-life”
case studies
Substantive Tests
Emphasize to their personnel the importance of obtaining evidence from
third parties whenever possible and that the presumption that receivables are
to be confirmed when they are material is not easily overcome
Provide more guidance to their personnel on other types of information,
in addition to or in lieu of receivable balances, that might be confirmed
Develop case studies or other communications to audit personnel that
illustrate the dangers of losing control over the confirmation process, of
accepting facsimile responses to confirmation requests without taking
appropriate precautions, and of not following up and appropriately resolving all
exceptions noted during the audit
Require that at least an experienced audit manager review the resolution
of all “exceptions” noted during the audit and be satisfied that they were
resolved appropriately and that appropriate decisions regarding the need for
additional substantive tests were made
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About half of the firms reported integrating this Panel
recommendation into their inspection procedures. The
other half did not specifically respond as to whether they
have implemented this recommendation.

All of the firms report that their audit model links the risk
assessment of internal control to the nature, timing and
extent of their audit testwork.
The firms also stress the linking concept in training. One
firm reported that this concept is stressed at every level
of training.

The firms reported creating new practice aids and reemphasizing the importance of obtaining third party
evidence.
All of the firms believe they implemented or had
previously implemented this recommendation.
Most of the firms reported emphasizing “real-life” or
potentially “real” scenarios emphasizing the importance
of sending out, controlling and receiving confirmations.

A small majority of the firms reported having a
requirement that at least a senior manager review the
resolution of all “exceptions.” The remaining firms stated:
a) the partner is allowed the discretion of determining the
level involved in resolving “exceptions”; b) the level of
clearing the “exception” is not specified by the firm; and
c) no specific response to this Panel recommendation. In
this instance the firm did not respond as to whether they
have implemented this Panel recommendation.

Resolution of Issues
Reinforce the importance of consulting on important issues
Vigorously enforce their consultation policies by taking strong actions
with respect to those who do not consult when they should, as revealed by the
firm’s inspection program or other events

See response directly below.
The majority of the firms responded positively to this
recommendation. One firm reported issuing guidance
requiring consultation on significant matters, with
enforcement against those who fail to consult in the
appropriate circumstances. Another firm reported
summarizing and communicated to all audit personnel
the required consultation procedures in a practice aid
issued in April 2001.

Analytical procedures
2.124 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Ensure that their audit methodologies provide definitive guidance on
analytical procedures. At a minimum, specific guidance should be provided in
the following areas:
Developing expectations
Characteristics and reliability of different types of data
Using planning materiality in designing substantive analytical procedures
Establishing desired levels of assurance for substantive analytical
procedures
Establishing precision levels that depend on the level of assurance the
auditor desires from analytical procedures
Relating control risk assessments to the objectives of analytical
procedures
Considering the role of account-level or assertion-level risk assessments
(e.g., low-risk vs. high-risk assessments) in designing analytical procedures
The effect of the nature of particular accounts or assertions (e.g.,
balance sheet vs. income statement accounts) on analytical procedures
Identifying, investigating and evaluating the results of analytical
procedures (including obtaining additional evidence to corroborate the
responses to inquiries)
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The firms reported that the list following list of Panel
recommendations has either been implemented or was
previously included in the firm’s audit methodology and
guidance.

Specifying the appropriate level of personnel assigned to perform
analytical procedures, and the responsibilities of those assigned to review their
work
Assessing the results of analytical procedures in the final stage of the
audit
Documentation requirements consistent with the objectives of the
analytical procedures
Ensuring that training programs specifically address analytical
procedures, are taken by all levels of audit personnel and employ “real-life,
practical, how-to” case examples in varying circumstances that illustrate the
firm’s methodology and guidance. Depending on levels of personnel, such
training programs should include basic concepts of financial statement
analysis as well as techniques used by analysts in evaluating the securities of
different types of entities.

All of the firms reported that this area is covered in
training programs.

Auditing revenue
2.140 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Test the cutoff of revenue when inherent or control risks relating to such
transactions are other than low, and specifically when there is a high level of
sales transactions or individually significant sales transactions near the end of
the reporting period. Cutoff tests should be more extensive than tests of only a
few transactions before and after the close of the period. Cutoff testing often
should require the auditor’s physical presence at the entity’s location(s) at
period end.
Develop training materials, including case studies, focused on auditing
revenue recognition issues in specific industries. Require professionals
working on engagements in those industries to complete the training

All of the firms reported the importance of revenue cutoff. However, most of the firms were silent as to whether
they had specifically implemented this recommendation.

All of the firms stress the importance of revenue
recognition and cut-off testwork in training. One firm
reported producing and including a video in training that
covers “bill and hold”, side agreements, right of return,
percentage of completion and channel stuffing. Another
firm reported issuing a practice aid in October 2001,
reminding engagement teams to document significant
considerations in auditing revenues, including cut-off
procedures.

Auditing estimates and judgments
2.161 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Provide training on the application of SAS No. 57 and the provisions of
SFAS No. 5 and related guidance
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Most of the firms reported that estimates and judgments
are covered in training.

One firm reported creating guidance in 27 different
industries on the most likely estimate risk for those
companies. They are currently working on expanding the
guidance to include 13 more industries.
Encourage engagement teams to apply audit tests to reserve activity on
a timely basis – for example, during the performance of interim reviews

A small majority of the firms report that engagement
personnel are required to perform substantive
procedures during interim on areas such as reserves and
other significant transactions. Several firms report that
they encourage, but do not require engagement
personnel to perform such procedures at interim. One
firm reported that their policies exceed the procedures
required by SAS No. 71, but do not specially require that
audit tests are performed.

Adopt policies or internal guidance that promotes partner and manager
involvement in the evaluation of reserve activity during interim reviews (if they
do not already have such policies or guidance)

A small majority of the firms reported that they comply
with this Panel recommendation. The remaining firms
were silent with respect to the implementation of this
Panel recommendation.

Materiality, waived adjustments and analysts’ expectations
2.178 The Panel recommends that audit firms adopt policies (unless they
already have done so) requiring engagement teams to:
Obtain analysts’ reports and forecasts as part of gaining an
understanding of the entity’s business, consider the effects of those forecasts
and the information in those reports when assessing risks and evaluating
important issues, and include them among the factors considered when
evaluating the materiality of potential adjustments

The firm’s have either reported positive implementation
to this recommendation or to the spirit of the
recommendation. For example, one firm reports that
analysts’ reports are one source used in establishing an
understanding of the clients business. The firm’s policy
also identifies analysts’ earnings forecast as an important
qualitative factor in assessing materiality.
Another firm reports that they require that third party
expectations be considered when performing analytical
reviews and evaluating audit differences.
Yet another firm reported that analysts’ evaluations are
one of the considerations in evaluating materiality and
waived adjustments.
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Obtain an understanding of the entity’s policies and processes, if any, for
communicating information to analysts

Become aware of the information management provides to analysts,
such as by reading transcripts of the presentations or by listening to
management’s presentations to analysts when the presentations are available
by telephone, videotape, the Internet or other public communications vehicles

Going concern considerations
2.188 The Panel recommends that audit firms incorporate the following
matters into their training programs and audit methodologies:
Specific guidance on considering management’s plans for mitigating the
adverse effects of conditions and events that created the auditor’s substantial
doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, including
guidance on evidence supporting proposed cost reductions or other
prospective financial information

The firms responded in two ways to this
recommendation: 1) the firm did not believe that it was
appropriate to specifically require gaining an
understanding of how management communicates with
analysts, or 2) they were silent with respect to
implementing this specific recommendation.
The majority of the firms responded that they have
implemented this recommendation. One firm reported
that their guidance requires that analysts’
recommendation be documented as part of the planning
process. Another firm reported that the national/regional
office provides engagement teams certain information
about their clients, such as a) negative analysts reports,
b) significant stock movement and c) litigation.

All of the firms reported implementing this Panel
recommendation or assert that the appropriate guidance
regarding assessing the going concern consideration
was in place prior to the Panel’s report.
One firm reported that they required the use a practice
aid when a heightened risk of failure exists. The firm
requires consultation when engagement teams identify
going concern considerations. The firm has also
performed a review of their entire client portfolio flagging
the clients that have an increased going concern risk.
One firm reported issuing a practice aid on going concern
in October 2001, which provides comprehensive and
detailed guidance on considering management’s plan for
mitigating the adverse effects of the conditions and
events that led to substantial doubt and outlines the
circumstances that require consultation.
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Practice aids, such as a template for confirming plans involving thirdparty financial support, and “real-life” examples of evidential matter that
corroborates representations regarding management’s plans, as well as
examples of evidential matter that does not

Most of the firms reported enhancing their quality control
system as a result of this Panel recommendation. One
reported this recommendation was previously a part of
their system of quality control prior to the
recommendation.
One firm reported that in February 2001, the Firm’s
national office hosted a conference call for audit partners
to discuss going concern matters in the context of the
current economic situation. In Charge-training also
covers this area.
Another firm reported that they designed a new practice
aid to address the going concern assumption and to
document the engagement team’s consideration.

Internal Auditors
2.200 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Review the adequacy of their policies requiring auditors to test the work
performed by internal audit and to document their work relating to internal
audit.

Consider during their internal inspection programs whether engagement
teams are using the work of internal audit excessively, especially on large
engagements.

All of the firms responded positively to this
recommendation. One firm issued a practice aid, which
includes guidance on testing the work performed by the
internal auditor and the required documentation. One
firm has developed a practice aid that documents the
engagement teams assessment and reliance on the
company’s internal audit function.
The majority of the firms did not respond to this
recommendation.
One firm reported that the internal inspection considers
whether the engagement team gained an understanding
of the internal audit function and whether they used the
internal auditors work as evidence and follow GAAS in
doing so.
Another firm reported that they review reliance on
internal auditors when performing inspections. In the last
two inspections, there were no instances where a review
team concluded that the engagement team relied
excessively on the internal auditors.
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Communicating with audit committees
2.217 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Recognize the board of directors and audit committee, acting on behalf
of the shareholders, as the parties to whom they are accountable and tailor
their relationships and communications accordingly
Make sure the audit committee’s expectations are fully understood and
that their communications with the committee are directly responsive to those
expectations

All of the firms reported that they understand that the
board and directors and audit committee was their
ultimate client, acting on behalf of the shareholders.
Several of the firms reported that they have publications
that assist the audit committee and board directors in
ensuring they understand their role and function.

Reexamine firm guidance for reporting to audit committees and, if
applicable, modify the guidance to promote candid discussions with the
committee on:

One firm reported having issued extensive guidance on
how to conduct candid discussion with the audit
committees about risks, risk management and internal
controls, and the quality of financial reporting and
accounting.

Significant information system risks, including those related to any
industry-specific regulations or issues
Qualitative observations about internal control
Earnings management and fraud
3.52 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Begin working immediately with the concepts in the recommendations to
the ASB to enhance the auditor’s ability to detect financial statement fraud.
The results of those efforts should be shared with the ASB for consideration in
developing its standards, with the intent of expediting the standard-setting
process.
Develop or expand training programs for auditors at all levels oriented
toward responsibilities and procedures for fraud detection. These programs
should emphasize interviewing skills and the exercise of professional
skepticism, as well as testing techniques. They also should emphasize
(especially to staff and in-charge personnel) that misappropriation of assets is
a significant risk and that being alert to its possibility at any level in an entity is
necessary. Training programs should include case examples of how
defalcations might be effected, the types of controls over the safeguarding of
assets that are effective in preventing and detecting defalcations, and how
defalcations are concealed. Special emphasis should be given to how
information technology might be used to misappropriate assets and disguise
the results.
Using auditors with forensic audit backgrounds to assist in this training would
be beneficial. Personnel with experience in industries where the risk of
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The firms represent that they are ready to implement the
enhanced fraud standards when they are issued.

All the firms report that the concept of fraud and relevant
auditing standards are integrated into the audit training
curriculum.

Most of the firms either did not respond to this Panel
recommendation or they reported they are in the midst of

material misappropriations of assets is believed to be high (e.g., in certain
cash-intensive industries) also might be used to assist in such training.

These programs should be implemented as soon as practicable, but in any
event no later than when the ASB issues its strengthened standards.
Furthermore, training programs of this nature should not be one-time events.
Firms should be committed to refreshing and improving these programs as
circumstances in clients and industries evolve and more is learned about
fraud.
Discuss with audit committees the vulnerability of the entity to fraudulent
financial reporting and the entity’s exposure to misappropriation of assets

a pilot study designed to implement the recommendation.
One firm reported that in 2001, all partners and
managers were required to take a two-hour session
delivered by forensic experts. The objective of the
session was to increase awareness of issues that result
in financial statement fraud.
The firms are waiting for the ASB to issue a new
standard before implementing enhanced fraud audit
procedures. In the meantime, each firm addresses fraud
in their training curriculum.
The majority of the firms did not respond to this
recommendation. However, one firm reported that their
existing audit policies address the responsibility to
communicate to audit committees the existence of
fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of
assets.

Professional leadership – the tone at the top
4.5 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Emphasize to all audit personnel the importance of performing highquality professional work. This message should be delivered frequently by the
CEO, COO, leaders at the firm’s regional and office levels, and the head of the
assurance practice, as well as by the firm’s top technical partners. It should
stand out above all other messages.
The message should be a positive, constructive message that is
refreshed frequently so it commands attention, rather than becoming a tired
slogan that is ignored. For example, it might reference specific situations
where client management, audit committees or others recognized and
applauded audit quality. In addition, situations could be recognized in which
individuals or engagement teams took difficult stands on earnings
management issues, issues involving possible management fraud or illegal
acts, or contentious accounting issues. Other messages might cover
important developments in the profession that affect the quality of accounting
and auditing.
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All of the firms responded positively to this Panel
recommendation. All the firms are sending out the
message of the importance of performing high quality
audits, from upper management on down.
All of the firms responded positively to this Panel
recommendation.
One firm responded that the Managing Partner of the
Firm routinely presents material at staff training courses.
One firm responded that the Chairman and the Vice
Chairman have communicated the importance of audit
quality and the Panel’s recommendations in recent
communications.

Address the importance of the role and responsibility of audit
professionals, as well as the concepts of integrity and objectivity,
independence, professional skepticism and accountability to the public. These
concepts should be introduced on or near the day professionals, both
experienced and inexperienced, are hired. They should be reinforced regularly
and be integral to the firm’s training efforts.

Most of the firm responded positively to this Panel
recommendation.

Develop marketing and advertising messages targeted to users of
audited financial statements, coordinated with similar AICPA messages, which
promote the importance of audits.

Most of the firm did not respond to this Panel
recommendation.

Several of the firms did not specifically respond to this
Panel recommendation.

Professional development
4.16 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Support and adopt the competency-based learning concepts in the
AICPA exposure draft, Statement on Standards for Continuing Professional
Education, and use a core competency model that is similar in design to the
AICPA model as a basis for career planning and self-assessing whether
individual performance and competency goals are being achieved
Make increased knowledge and skills a high priority for all experience
levels, with a particular focus on meeting the increased audit demands called
for by the Panel’s recommendations in Chapters 2 and 3

Most of the firms reported that they have been supportive
of and have adopted this recommendation.

All of the firms responded positively to this
recommendation.
One firm reported that professionals receive
approximately 80 to 100 hours training a year.
One firm reported that a training curriculum is developed
that meets the needs of professionals necessary to
effectively fulfill the requirements of the varying roles on
the audit engagement.

Personnel management
4.21 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Review performance measures for all experience levels, and ensure that
performing high-quality audits is appropriately recognized as the highest
priority in performance evaluations and in compensation, promotion and
retention decisions for all personnel. The measures should focus on such
matters as (1) the depth and substance of understanding of the client’s
business and risks, (2) responsiveness to unexpected or unplanned conditions
encountered in audits, (3) development of innovative audit approaches, (4)
professional skepticism and persistence, and (5) knowledge of accounting
principles and practices.
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All of the firms reported that quality is one of the
elements considered in promoting and increasing
compensation. None of the firms stated positively that
high quality audits was recognized as the highest priority
in these decisions.

Work cooperatively with the SECPS in developing effective measures of
audit quality and incorporate those measures into their internal inspection
processes. (See the Panel’s recommendations to the SEC Practice Section in
the section “Enhancing Peer Reviews” in Chapter 6.)

All of the firms reported that they are active and work
cooperatively with the SECPS.

Time pressures on auditors
4.27 The Panel recommends that audit firms:
Expand the client acceptance and continuance assessment processes to
include inquiries about possible time pressures on specific engagements that
could create an environment in which audit quality might be compromised.
Provide guidance and training on actions that engagement partners and
other supervisory personnel should consider in managing time pressures
Incorporate appropriate measures of partners’ and other supervisory
personnel’s abilities to manage time pressures in upward evaluations or other
similar feedback processes
Reaffirm periodically with partners and managers the importance of
establishing realistic time budgets and work loads

Some of the firms reported that time pressures are on the
factors the firm considers in determining client
continuance. Several other firms did not specifically
respond to this Panel recommendation.
Several of the firms reported that they offer training in
time management, while other firms did not specifically
respond to this Panel recommendation.
Several of the firms reported that they have upward
feedback programs, while other firms did not specifically
respond to this Panel recommendation.
Most of the firms did not specifically respond to this
recommendation.
However, one firm reported that in early 2001, an
Assurance leadership communication to partners,
addressed the topic of dealing with pressures associated
with the profession.

International
7.47 While the changes in the SECPS membership rules described earlier in
this chapter are important first steps, the Panel believes that additional steps
are necessary to effect significant improvements in worldwide accounting and
auditing quality. The Panel believes that the major firms share this view and
that they are in varying stages of upgrading their international quality for the
benefit of all users of audited financial statements, not just those who invest in
companies whose securities are registered with the SEC. Accordingly, the
Panel recommends that audit firms:
Implement uniform audit methodologies throughout the world that use
international auditing standards as the base minimum
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Most of the firms reported that they have one common
global audit methodology.

Subject all audit practice units to periodic inspection procedures covering
all audits, not just foreign registrants or affiliates of U.S. SEC registrants
Assign personnel throughout the world to function as technical
consultants in the application of international accounting and auditing
standards. Firms should consider establishing intra-firm international
“clearinghouses” to resolve differences in the application of international
accounting and auditing standards and promote consistency of practice.

Most of the firms report all worldwide offices are subject
to a compliance monitoring program and internal practice
review.
Most of the firms responded positively to this Panel
recommendation.
One firm reported recently establishing an internal
International Accounting Standards Board, which has the
responsibility for matters associated with International
Accounting Standards (“IAS”). The Board is responsible
for issuing definitive interpretations on IAS standards and
determining the appropriate accounting treatment.
Another firm reported having an active expatriate
program, with U.S. partners assigned throughout the
world to assist with technical and client service matters.

SECPS Peer Review Committee
Assessing inherent risk
2.50 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
Request that peer reviewers evaluate the adequacy and extent of
implementation of firms’ methodologies, guidance and training materials
relating to assessing inherent risk
Include items in the peer review questionnaires that address the
appropriateness of the inherent risk assessments made, whether they were
made at the appropriate financial statement levels, who made and reviewed
them, and whether they were made and reviewed on a timely basis
Request that peer reviewers include their findings in this area in their
reports to the SECPS Peer Review Committee

Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire
No action. PRC is still considering how to implement this
recommendation. The small Firms have discussed this
recommendation as recently as February 5, 2002
No action.

Assessing control risk
2.79 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
Develop more detailed inquiries for peer reviewers about firms’
methodologies and engagement performance relating to audit work on internal
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A portion of this recommendation is included in pilot
program supplemental review questionnaire. The PRC is

control, focusing particularly on internal control considerations in planning the
audit. Peer review inquiries also should focus on the depth of the engagement
team’s understanding of the entity’s information system and related risks that
are relevant to financial reporting. In addition, they should address the
engagement team’s effectiveness in identifying, testing and assessing key
controls, and the sufficiency of the involvement of experienced professionals.
Instruct peer review team captains to include professionals with the
necessary specialized technology expertise on their peer review teams.

Request that peer reviewers include their findings in this area in their
reports to the SECPS Peer Review Committee

still considering this recommendation.

Not specifically addressed, however, the reviews of large
firms generally include such personnel on the peer
review teams.

No action.

Linking the risk assessments to substantive tests
2.108 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee:
Linkage
Request that peer reviewers evaluate the adequacy of firms’ policies,
procedures, guidance and training materials relating to linkage decisions,
including those involving the selection of the appropriate procedures and
sampling
Request that peer reviewers determine whether firms have conducted
the requisite training in these areas and evaluate the effectiveness of the
engagement teams’ implementation of the firms’ methodology and guidance
materials
Include items in the peer review questionnaires that are similar to those
covered in the QPRs, such as whether the specific tests performed or other
actions taken in response to the risk assessments were appropriate and
sufficient, whether the thought processes that led to the specific tests or
actions were thorough and gave appropriate consideration to the appropriate
factors, whether those who initially selected and subsequently reviewed the
specific tests or other actions had the appropriate knowledge and skills and
did so on a timely basis, and whether the extent of substantive tests (including,
when appropriate, sample sizes) was sufficient
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Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire, except with respect to sampling

Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire, except with respect to sampling

No action has occurred on this recommendation.
However, some of this occurs informally when the Team
Captain provides the reviewed firm oral
recommendations.

Substantive Tests
Request that peer reviewers evaluate whether engagement teams are
(a) confirming receivables whenever they are material unless the presumption
that receivables will be confirmed clearly has been overcome, (b) confirming
other types of information in addition to, or in lieu of, receivable balances,
when appropriate, (c) maintaining control over the confirmation process, (d)
taking appropriate precautions when facsimile responses to confirmations are
received, and (e) appropriately following up and resolving any exceptions
noted and, when appropriate, performing additional audit tests

Items a and e covered in AICPA peer review
questionnaire. Item b covered in pilot program
supplemental review questionnaire. Items c and d not
covered

Resolution of Issues
Request that peer reviewers consider whether there were any issues on
the audit engagements reviewed for which they believed consultation would
have been prudent (or was required by firm policy) and for which it did not
occur (or was not documented)

Covered in AICPA peer review questionnaire

Reporting
Request that peer reviewers include their findings in these areas in their
reports to the SECPS Peer Review Committee
Analytical procedures
2.125 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee
request that peer reviewers:
Evaluate firms’ methodology, guidance and training materials relating to
analytical procedures
Determine whether firms have carried out the requisite training and
evaluate the effectiveness of the firms’ implementation of their methodology
related to analytical procedures on audit engagements
Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee

Auditing revenue
2.141 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee
request that peer reviewers:
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No action.

Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire
Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire
No action.

Consider the adequacy of firms’ policies, guidance and training (and any
changes in them) in the area of auditing revenue recognition

Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire

Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee

No action.

Auditing estimates and judgments
2.162 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee
request that peer reviewers:
Evaluate firms’ policies, training and guidance materials on auditing
estimates and
Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee
Materiality, waived adjustments and analysts’ expectations
2.179 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee
request that peer reviewers:
Evaluate the effectiveness with which engagement teams implement
SAS No. 89 and SAB No. 99 and determine whether additional guidance or
training is needed
Review and evaluate firms’ policies, if any, for understanding the entity’s
policies and processes for communicating information to analysts; obtaining
analysts’ reports and forecasts, and considering them when assessing risks
and evaluating important issues and the materiality of potential adjustments;
and becoming aware of the information management provides to analysts
Evaluate the effectiveness with which engagement teams implement
their firm’s policies and determine whether additional guidance or training is
needed
Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee
Going concern considerations
2.189 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee
request that peer reviewers:
Evaluate the adequacy of firms’ guidance and training (and any changes
in them) in the area of going concern considerations
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Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire
No action.

Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire
Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire. However, the concept of reviewing
analysts’ reports is not included in professional
standards.
Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire
No action.

Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire

Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee

No action.

Internal Auditors
2.201 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee
request that peer reviewers:
Address the adequacy of firms’ policies, procedures and guidance on the
testing of internal audit work and the documentation of auditors’ considerations
and work related to internal audit.
Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee

Some coverage in AICPA engagement questionnaire.
Not covered in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire this year.
No action has been taken on this recommendation as of
February 15, 2002.

Communicating with audit committees
2.218 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee
request that peer reviewers:
Address the adequacy of firms’ guidance on reporting to audit
committees.
Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee

Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire
No action.

Earnings management and fraud
3.53 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request
that peer reviewers:
Evaluate the implementation of the strengthened auditing standards
issued by the ASB and evaluate the training programs developed in response
to the Panel’s recommendations to audit firms. The Peer Review Committee
should develop guidance for peer reviewers to conduct these evaluations. The
evaluations should address the priority given by the firms to fraud-related
training; the involvement of supervisory engagement personnel in planning,
supervision and review; and the adequacy of documentation.
Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee.

34

Awaiting action by the ASB. The pilot program covered
the revenue recognition aspect of earnings management.

Awaiting action by the ASB.

Professional leadership – the tone at the top
4.6 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request
that peer reviewers:
Assess the timeliness, frequency and appropriateness of internal
messages from firm leaders about audit quality
Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee

Professional development
4.17 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request
that peer reviewers:
Assess whether engagement teams have the requisite knowledge and
skills for the particular engagements
Make qualitative assessments of the audit firm’s policies and
performance related to professional development
Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee
Personnel management
4.22 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request
that peer reviewers:
Assess the role that performing high-quality professional work plays in
performance reviews and in compensation, promotion and retention decisions
at all levels of audit personnel
Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee

Time pressures on auditors
4.28 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Peer Review Committee request
that peer reviewers:
Assess the extent of time pressures on audit engagements and the firm’s
success in managing those pressures
Include their findings in this area in their reports to the SECPS Peer
Review Committee
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Covered generally in pilot program focus group meetings
with reviewed firm personnel.
No action.

Included as a procedure in SECPS and POB oversight.
Included in pilot program supplemental review
questionnaire.
No action.

Covered generally in pilot program focus group meetings
with reviewed firm personnel.
No action.

Covered generally in pilot program focus group meetings
with reviewed firm personnel.
No action.

SEC Practice Section of the AICPA
2.30 Many of the Panel’s recommendations reflect a belief that the SECPS
should be the source of both leadership and specific guidance to audit firms in
the effort to strengthen their quality controls. Only with specific guidance can
peer reviewers effectively assess compliance with quality control standards.
The SECPS Peer Review Committee should make its peer reviews of firms not
only more frequent, but also more rigorous. The role of peer review in a
program of continuous improvement of audit effectiveness should be given
high priority. The SECPS’s role in providing assurance that audits are being
conducted effectively, with appropriate oversight by the POB, is critical to
maintaining the profession’s right to regulate itself.
6.32 The Panel recommends that:
The SECPS Executive Committee retain its responsibility for approving
members of the PRC, the QCIC, the SEC Regulations Committee and the
PITF
The preceding four groups continue to report to the Executive Committee

No action required.

No action required.
2001/2 ISB Budget approved at May EC meeting.

The SECPS continue to fund the ISB

Audit committees
Communicating and reporting on internal control
2.88 The Panel recommends that audit committees increase the time and
attention they devote to discussions of internal control with management and
both the internal and external auditors. Specifically, audit committees should:
Obtain a written report from management on the effectiveness of internal
control over financial reporting (ordinarily using the criteria in the 1992 report
of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
[COSO]). Annual reporting by management on internal control to the audit
committee is necessary for the effective discharge of the audit committee’s
responsibilities and will serve as a catalyst for its more substantive
involvement in the area of internal control and a more meaningful dialogue
with the internal and external auditors about controls. It also should provide a
basis for discussions about the degree of the external auditor’s involvement
with internal control during the financial statement audit.
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The POB has no effective way to determine the extent to
which audit committees have studied or acted on the
Panel’s recommendations.

Establish specific expectations with management and the internal and
external auditors about the qualitative information needs of the committee
related to internal control. Particular emphasis should be given to
understanding management’s and the auditors’ views on (1) the control
environment and (2) the controls (or lack thereof) over financial reporting, with
particular attention to controls in higher-risk areas of the company’s
information systems. In addition, these discussions should include the effects
of technology on current and future information systems

Auditing estimates and judgments
2.164 The Panel recommends that audit committees evaluate the nature of
entities’ reserves and review activity in them with both management and the
auditors.

Communicating with audit committees
2.219 The Panel recommends that audit committees:
Specify in their charters and reflect in their actions, as recommended by
the Blue Ribbon Committee, “that the outside auditor is ultimately accountable
to the board of directors and the audit committee, as representatives of the
shareholders, and that these shareholder representatives have the ultimate
authority and responsibility to select, evaluate, and where appropriate, replace
the outside auditors (or to nominate the outside auditors to be proposed for
shareholder approval in any proxy statement).”
Develop a formal calendar of activities related to those areas of
responsibility prescribed in the committee charter, including a meeting plan
that is reviewed and agreed to by the entire board. The meeting plan should
include communications between the committee chair or full committee and
the auditor before the release of interim or year-end financial data. In addition,
the Panel recommends a minimum of two face-to-face meetings during the
year with the external auditor and at least one executive session with the
internal and external auditors without management’s presence.
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Take charge of their agenda and ensure, in particular, that it focuses on,
among other matters, risks directly affecting the financial statements, key
controls, interim financial information, policies and practices for management’s
communications with analysts, and the qualitative aspects of financial
reporting
Inquire about time pressures on the auditor, including pressures on the
timing of audit procedures; the degree of management’s cooperation with the
auditor; and their potential effects on audit effectiveness
Review the internal and external auditors’ performance on an annual
basis; exercise responsibility, as the external auditor’s primary client, to assess
the auditor’s responsiveness to the committee’s and board of directors’
expectations; and be satisfied that the auditor is appropriately compensated
for performing a thorough audit
Require the auditor and management to advise the committee of the
entity’s plans to hire any of the audit firm’s personnel into high-level positions,
and the actions, if any, that the auditor and management intend to take to
ensure that the auditor maintains independence

Earnings management and fraud
3.54 The Panel recommends that audit committees:
Request management to report on the control environment within the
entity and how that environment and the entity’s policies and procedures
(including management’s monitoring activities) serve to prevent and detect
financial statement fraud. Such reporting should acknowledge, in explicit
terms, that fraud prevention and detection are primarily the responsibility of
management. It also should help audit committees assess the strength of
management’s commitment to a culture of intolerance for improper conduct.
Furthermore, audit committees should seek the views of auditors on their
assessment of the risks of financial statement fraud and their understanding of
the controls designed to mitigate such risks.
Accept responsibility for ascertaining that the auditors receive the
necessary cooperation from management to carry out their duties in
accordance with the strengthened auditing standards to be developed by the
ASB.
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Non-audit services
5.30 The Panel recommends that audit committees pre-approve non-audit
services that exceed a threshold determined by the committee. This
recommendation is consistent with the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees
regarding auditors’ services. The threshold should be at a level that ensures
that significant services are pre-approved, but not so low that the committee
assumes a management function.
When audit committees determine whether to approve specific non-audit
services, the Panel recommends that they consider the same guiding principle
and the factors suggested above for use by the ISB.

Securities and Exchange Commission
Communicating and reporting on internal control
2.89 The Panel recommends that, if management is required to report to
shareholders on the effectiveness of internal control, the SEC require either
external auditor reporting on internal control or management to explicitly state
that the external auditors do not express an opinion on internal control.
Otherwise, the Panel believes that investors may draw unwarranted inferences
about auditors’ involvement with and responsibility for the appropriateness of
management’s assertions in such reports or about the degree of internal
control work that auditors perform in connection with their audits of financial
statements.
Non-audit services
5.31 The Panel recommends that the SEC and the ISB evaluate on a
continuing basis the effectiveness of the disclosures made under
Independence Standard No. 1 and the SEC’s new audit committee disclosure
requirements, as well as any new rules issued by the ISB or by the SEC
pursuant to its rule-making initiatives.

6.36 The Panel recommends that the SEC, as the statutory overseer of the
quality of audits of SEC registrants:
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The SEC asserts that if the Commission determines to
pursue the adoption of a requirement for management to
report on the effectiveness of the registrant’s internal
system, the SEC staff will consider recommending that
the Commission also adopt provisions that clearly
stipulate the auditor’s role in relation to the
management’s report.

The SEC staff will continue to evaluate the effectiveness
of letters from auditors to audit committees under ISB
No. 1, and the Commission’s new audit committee
disclosure requirements, during the review and comment
process, enforcement investigations, oversight of the
profession’s peer review and other self-regulatory
programs, and during other discussion with registrants
and the auditors of their financial statements.

Encourage and support the ISB in carrying out its mission, recognizing
that the SEC retains ultimate authority over auditor independence with respect
to SEC registrants

The ISB disbanded as of July 31, 2001. The SEC staff
intends to consult with the AICPA’s Professional Ethics
Executive Committee as appropriate.
The Commission also intends to support the POB, and to
the extent appropriate and as requested by the POB or
its staff, assist the POB in conducting its activities.

Support the IIC and work with the ISB to clarify the IIC’s role
Assist in implementing the POB’s activities contemplated by the charter
Support the POB’s authority as enumerated in its charter to enable the
POB to serve as an independent, effective, unifying leader of the profession’s
voluntary self-regulatory process
Enhancing peer reviews
6.43 The Panel recommends that the SEC mandate that all firms that audit
SEC registrants be enrolled in a peer review or similar monitoring program that
includes public oversight. With respect to foreign-based audit firms, the
requirement should extend to the peer review or similar monitoring programs
or processes in their foreign locations. (See the Panel’s recommendations to
the International Federation of Accountants on Quality Assurance over
Auditing in Chapter 7.)
Enhancing the disciplinary process
6.59 The Panel recommends that the SEC allocate additional resources to its
enforcement activities directed at allegations of failed audits. The Panel
recognizes that a finite budget imposes limitations on the SEC’s ability to apply
its investigative resources wherever needed. A larger budget allocation to
enforcement efforts directed at allegations of failed audits would have salutary
effects on the accounting profession, and reassure the investing public that the
main “cop on the beat” recognizes the critical importance of audits and the
deterrent effects of vigorous enforcement.

6.60 Because the Panel believes the study of the AAERs described in
Appendix F was very useful and provided valuable information to supplement
the evidence obtained from other activities, the Panel recommends that the
SEC:
Periodically, such as annually or biennially, undertake a similar study
and disseminate the results
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The SEC staff estimates that less than 100 domestic
accounting firms that file audit reports with the SEC are
not in a peer review program. Before considering this
requirement, the SEC may need to consider the cost
versus the benefit of mandating such a requirement.

During 2000, the SEC began to increase the number of
accountants on its staff. Also, in 2000, the SEC created
a Financial Fraud Task Force to investigate certain major
accounting fraud cases on an accelerated basis using
teams of specialized accountants and other
professionals. Additionally, the SEC is now investigating
auditors, when relevant; at the same time they are
investigating company and insider personnel to reduce
the duplication of effort.

The SEC staff believes that such an analysis is beneficial
to registrants, the auditing profession, and the SEC staff.

Document information on the auditors’ work in every enforcement
investigation involving materially misstated financial statements, not just those
in which the auditor is named in an AAER. (In making this recommendation,
the Panel recognizes that the SEC staff routinely examines the auditors’
involvement in each case.) The SEC staff may wish to employ the Panel’s
questionnaire as a guide in identifying the types of information to be
documented.

However, it appears to the staff, that significant AAERs
are currently analyzed and digested on a real time basis
by a number of organizations, including the press, the
accounting profession, accounting and auditing standard
setters, academia, and others. The marginal benefits of
an additional annual or biennial study by the staff
therefore may not be sufficient to justify the resources it
would take to complete such a study.
When appropriate, the Division of Enforcement does, and
will continue to, document in AAER’s the role of auditors
in financial frauds.

Financial Accounting Standards Board
Auditing revenue
2.142 The Panel recommends that the FASB add revenue recognition to its
agenda. The Panel believes that an authoritative statement on the broad
principles of revenue recognition is sorely needed. Because this may be a
long-term project, in the interim the FASB (or other appropriate bodies such as
the Accounting Standards Executive Committee [AcSEC] or the Emerging
Issues Task Force [EITF]) should identify and resolve or clarify areas of
diverse or uncertain practice.

The FASB is determining the scope of a possible major
project on revenue recognition. In January 2002, the
FASB issued a request for comments on a proposal to
undertake a project related to the recognition of revenues
and liabilities. Additionally, the EITF has addressed a
number of narrow revenue recognition issues over the
past several years.

Auditing estimates and judgments
2.163 The Panel recommends that the FASB:
Clarify the accounting for contingencies to enable more consistent
application of the criteria for accruing losses.
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FASB issued an Exposure Draft on “Accounting for the
Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets” and for
obligations associated with disposal activities in October
2000. This guidance will replace the guidance currently
contained in EITF 94-3, “Liability Recognition for Certain
Employee Termination Benefits and Other Costs to Exit
an Activity”.
The FASB does not believe that a recommendation to
reconsider accounting for contingencies is appropriate at
this time.

Establish a protocol with the ASB to assess the auditability of proposed
accounting standards before they are issued, including evaluations of
auditability when proposed standards are field tested

Formalize the existing liaison between the ASB and the FASB to help
ensure timely identification of and reaction to audit issues arising from newly
issued standards

Going concern considerations
2.190 The Panel recommends that the FASB:
Define the going concern concept and clarify that management, not the
auditor, has the primary responsibility to assess whether the entity has the
ability to remain a going concern
Consider the appropriateness of the one-year time horizon in SAS No.
59. The FASB should evaluate this time horizon and recognize its importance
to auditors in framing their audit reports.
Promulgate explicit going concern disclosure requirements to fit various
circumstances. Such requirements should include disclosures about the
entity’s reliance on the financial support of related or third parties to mitigate
the adverse effects of conditions and events that create substantial doubt
about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.

The FASB has met with the ASB to discuss the Panel’s
recommendation. The ASB stated that they will work
with AcSEC to provide input on audit concerns that they
identify with proposed accounting standards. The ASB
has also acknowledged that they feel free to
communicate with the FASB, if they deem appropriate,
on audit issues, arising from newly issued standards. To
date the ASB has not identified activities that the FASB
needs to take with respect to this area. Additionally, no
formal protocol has been established between the two
parties.
The FASB staff has worked closely with the Audit Issues
Task Force of the ASB on several implementation issues
that arose following the issuance of FASB 140,
Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial
Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities.
No formal protocol has been established between the
two parties.

The FASB has met with the AICPA to discuss the Panel’s
recommendations. The AICPA agrees that the aspects
of the recommendations concerning the auditor’s reports
should be directed to the ASB rather than FASB.
The annual FASAC survey on new agenda priorities asks
respondent to evaluation a project on going concern
issues. Such a project could consider:
A definition of the going concern concept.
A clarification that management has the primary
responsibility to assess whether the entity has the ability
to remain a going concern.
Consideration of disclosure with respect to goingconcern considerations.
The results of the FASAC survey were discussed at the
December 4, 2001 Council meeting. The FASB has not
determined whether to take any action.
Additionally, the ASB is revising SAS 71, Interim
Financial Information, to update enhance the guidance
on reviews of interim financial statements. The current
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standard has no guidance related to going concern
issues.

Public Oversight Board
Proposed system of governance
6.23 The Panel recommends that the auditing profession’s system of
governance be unified under a strengthened, independent POB that oversees
the profession’s activities with respect to standard setting, monitoring,
discipline and special reviews. Accordingly, the POB should oversee the ASB,
the ISB, the SECPS Executive Committee, QCIC, the SECPS Peer Review
Committee, the Professional Issues Task Force (PITF), the SEC Regulations
Committee and the standard-setting activities of the PEEC that relate to audits
of public companies. The POB should serve as the oversight body to whom
the SEC, the state boards of accountancy, the auditing profession and the
public should look for leadership. This leadership position is intended to
enhance communications among the profession’s self-regulatory bodies in
order to facilitate the profession’s continuous improvement efforts and identify
and resolve important issues on a timely basis.
6.24 The Panel recommends that the POB, AICPA, SECPS and SEC work
together to create and implement a formal charter for the POB that would
include the responsibilities and powers enumerated in this report. The POB,
AICPA, SECPS, SEC and major firms should agree to the charter and
cooperate in facilitating its implementation.
6.25 The Panel believes the charter should cover the following matters:
The POB’s sole authority to determine its budget and financial and other
resources, and the profession’s obligation to provide those resources. The
Panel strongly believes that such “no-strings-attached funding” is absolutely
essential if the POB is to be effective and independent of the profession and if
the profession’s self-regulatory system is to be viable. The profession must not
be able to control or cut off the POB’s financial resources and thereby cause
irreparable harm to the profession’s self-regulatory system by destroying the
POB’s independence and others’ confidence in it. The POB’s annual
statement of expenditures should be audited and included in the POB’s
Annual Report to evidence its financial accountability.
The POB’s authority to oversee the activities of the ASB, the ISB, the
SECPS Executive Committee, QCIC, the SECPS Peer Review Committee, the
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The Charter of the POB approved by its members and
the AICPA Board of Directors in February 2001 unifies
and strengthens the POB's oversight of the professions
activities.

- see above

Section VI.A of the Charter provide for "adequate nostrings" finding. Once the POB submits and consults on
its annual budget, as called for above, the EC and the
AICPA Board shall not withhold funding for any reason.
Section VIII.D. of the Charter requires the POB to include
an audited statement of expenses in its annual report.

The POB Charter provides for the POB to consult on the
nominations for members of the EC, ASB and the ISB

PITF, the SEC Regulations Committee and the standard-setting activities of
the PEEC that relate to audits of public companies. The POB should approve
all appointments to the ASB, SECPS Executive Committee and ISB’s
Independence Issues Committee (IIC), as well as the ISB members who
represent the public accounting profession. Annually the POB should evaluate
whether the resources that the AICPA and the SECPS provide to the ASB and
the SECPS are sufficient for those bodies to meet their mandates. In addition,
the POB should oversee the AICPA’s evaluation, compensation, hiring and
promotion decisions with respect to its employees who constitute the ASB and
SECPS staffs.
Term limits for POB members. POB members should be limited to two
five-year terms, with staggered terms to ensure continuity.
A nominating committee responsible for identifying and nominating new
POB members. The nominating committee should be appointed by the POB
from names suggested by public and private institutions that are most
concerned with the quality of audits and financial reporting.
An advisory council to advise the POB on issues related to projects on
its agenda, new agenda items, project priorities and related matters. The POB
should appoint the council members, whose service should be limited to two
three-year terms. The council should comprise nine to fifteen people selected
from the constituencies that are concerned with audit quality and financial
reporting matters, thus ensuring the broadest spectrum of participants in the
self-regulation of the auditing profession. Council members should serve on a
voluntary, part-time basis and be available to meet with the POB at regularly
scheduled intervals (e.g., two to four times a year).
A coordinating task force of the chairs of each body within the POB’s
oversight. This task force would be responsible for sharing information related
to each body’s activities. It should meet periodically (e.g., two to four times a
year) to ensure effective communications among the bodies subject to POB
oversight. For example, the task force would provide a formal means for QCIC
and the PRC to communicate to the ASB, ISB and PEEC their findings and the
resulting implications for changes in standards.
The POB’s authority to commission special reviews related to significant
professional matters that affect the public’s confidence in the profession. One
such matter is the perceived lack of candid and timely public reporting of why
and how highly publicized audit failures and frauds occurred, together with an
analysis of the effectiveness of generally accepted auditing standards in such
circumstances and the actions that have been taken or will be taken to ensure
that such problems do not recur.
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and shall concur in the appointment of the Chair's of the
EC and ASB. The POB Charter calls for the POB to
evaluate resources of the SECPS and ASB and
information to support these evaluations has been
requested.

POB Charter provision II.D.
POB Charter provision II.B.

POB Charter provision VIII.F. provides for a review panel
to be selected to evaluate the effectiveness of the POB
oversight role and process at the end of three years. The
review panel is to specifically report on "a review of the
effectiveness of the annual outreach meeting in Section
VIII.H. and whether this annual outreach meeting
alleviates the need for an advisory council."

POB Charter provision VII.B. provides for a Coordinating
Task Force and its first meeting was held on October 11,
2001.

POB Charter provision VI.A. provides for the formation
and budgeting of both "anticipated oversight reviews"
and "unanticipated oversight reviews."

6.26 The Panel recommends that the POB, SEC, AICPA, SECPS and major
firms promptly agree to a charter for the POB. The Panel understands that
there are two matters in the August 22, 2000, draft charter that are still under
negotiation: (1) the POB’s role in the appointment of the chairs of the ASB
and the SECPS Executive Committee, and (2) the procedures for amending
the charter. Upon the successful conclusion of these negotiations, the Panel
believes the charter will result in a major step forward in the governance of the
profession. The draft charter includes a provision for the POB to conduct an
annual “outreach” meeting with representatives from the constituencies that
are concerned with audit quality and financial reporting matters. While this
may alleviate the need for a nominating committee and advisory council, the
Panel recommends that this issue be addressed in three years as part of the
POB’s review of the effectiveness of the self-regulatory oversight process as
contemplated in the draft charter.

POB Charter was approved by its members and the
AICPA Board of Directors in February 2001.

6.27 The Panel recommends that the POB and SEC acknowledge the need to
maintain a continuing dialogue that will foster a cooperative relationship,
protect and enhance mutual respect and confidence, and increase the public’s
respect for the profession and its role in the capital markets.

Ongoing dialogue with the SEC is occurring.

6.28 The Panel recommends that the POB and state boards of accountancy,
perhaps through the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy,
determine how best to facilitate meaningful continuing dialogue between the
POB and state boards.

Action required. As of February 15, 2002, no action has
commenced.

6.29 The Panel recommends that the POB:
Enhance its resources, including augmenting its staff with additional
qualified technical professionals, in order to implement the POB’s expanded
oversight role. Among other matters, the augmented staff would assist the
POB in overseeing the peer reviews of the largest firms. The POB should
identify such professionals as soon as possible.

POB staff resources have been enhanced, several
qualified technical professionals have been retained, and
the search for an additional full time staff member was
achieved with the hiring of John Weber.

Review its charter periodically to ensure its continuing adequacy in the
light of changing circumstances and, if appropriate, work with the AICPA,
SECPS and SEC to amend it

Ongoing and should be reported each year in the POB
Annual Report.

Review periodically the effectiveness of the ASB, the ISB, the SECPS
and other groups that it oversees and include its findings and conclusions in its
Annual Report

POB Charter provision VIII.C. required an annual
evaluation and recommendations with respect to those
organizations subject to POB oversight to be included in
the POB Annual Report.
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Summarize in its Annual Report the status of all AICPA Ethics Division
investigations of audits of SEC registrants when the civil litigation and public
regulatory investigations have been concluded (see the fourth
recommendation to the AICPA below)
Increase its public communications to expand the public’s awareness of
the POB, its activities and its value to the capital markets

The POB staff is working with the AICPA Ethics Division
to format such reporting in the POB Annual Report.

6.30 The Panel recommends that the SECPS and POB staffs compile data
from their oversight of peer reviews and QCIC investigations that will enhance
the diagnostic value of the peer review and QCIC findings to standard setters
and audit firms. The data should be communicated to the profession and,
when appropriate, to the public in the POB’s Annual Report. The data might
include the following:
Disciplinary measures taken by member firms resulting from
substandard performance
The audit firms’ fraud risk assessments and related responses, if any, on
audits where fraud is subsequently discovered
Data related to emerging issues that identify needed modifications to
professional standards or best practices guidance
Data on non-audit services provided to the audit clients encompassed by
peer reviews and QCIC investigations

Database elements have been agreed to and AICPA
database is in process of being programmed.

Enhancing peer reviews
6.41 The Panel recommends that the POB, by using its augmented staff (see
paragraph 6.29), expand its oversight throughout the peer reviews of the
largest firms on a “real-time” basis. The expanded role should include, at a
minimum:
Reviewing the qualifications of the peer review firm and the review team
captain

POB web site has been created and its Annual Report
has been expanded and is receiving ongoing attention.

The POB has augmented its staff with the hiring of parttime and one full time staff.
This recommendation has been implemented.

Attending important meetings, focus groups and interviews with firm
personnel

This recommendation has been implemented.

Reviewing the draft peer review reports before they are provided to
others

At a minimum, POB expects to review drafts at the same
time as the reviewed firm.
This recommendation has been implemented.

Overseeing the following:
The planning of the review
The review of the internal inspection program
The practice office and National office reviews
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The debriefing of engagement reviewers at the conclusion of the
reviews
The resolution of issues that arise during the reviews
6.56 (5).
The processes implemented by SECPS member firms when they
choose Option C should be subject to peer review and oversight by the POB.
At least one engagement to which Option C is being applied should be a
mandatory selection in the firm’s peer review and annual inspection program.
If the POB disagrees with a member firm’s selection or method of applying
Option C, it should promptly make its views known to the firm, SECPS
committee representatives and the SEC through its normal communication
channels, and to the public through its Annual Report and other publications.

The PRC will develop an annual program to address this
recommendation. This is underway.

6.56 (6).
The POB should report on these activities in its Annual Report on
an aggregate, no-name basis, including matters that are concluded through
the retirement of the partner, Ethics Division decisions or settlement of
litigation.

These activities will be reported in the 2001 POB Annual
Report.

6.57 The Panel recommends that the POB and SECPS review the results of
implementing these recommendations over a two- to three-year period to
determine their effectiveness. If the POB determines that these
recommendations have not satisfactorily protected the public, the Panel
recommends that the POB, in cooperation with the SEC, then seek legislation
to achieve the protections necessary to make the disciplinary process more
effective.

The POB will include the evaluation as part of the review
panel evaluation called for by the POB Charter provision
VIII.F.

6.58 The Panel recommends that the POB, concurrent with its oversight of the
disciplinary process outlined above, leverage the knowledge it gains to
determine whether changes in professional standards or further guidance is
needed and communicate these findings to the appropriate standard setters or
authoritative bodies.

The POB will implement this recommendation through its
Coordinating Task Force called for by the POB Charter
provision VII.B.

SECPS Quality Control Inquiry Committee
Earnings management and fraud
3.55 The Panel recommends that the SECPS Quality Control Inquiry
Committee (QCIC):

At its November 2000 meeting, the QCIC concluded that
it was supportive of the observations and
recommendations of the Panel regarding fraud;
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consequently, the QCIC had no further observations or
recommendations for the Fraud Task Force at this time.
The QCIC agreed that it would consider providing
comments to the Fraud Task Force as it finalizes its
study.
A three-member task force of the QCIC met with the
chair of the ASB’s Fraud Task Force and two other
members on June13, 2001 to provide comments on a
draft SAS. Mr. Landsittel, the chair of the Fraud Task
Force met with the QCIC at its August 2001 meeting to
discuss the ASB Fraud Status Report. The committee
expressed support for the up front communication
contemplated to occur between the engagement partner
and the rest of the audit team concerning the
consideration of fraud.

•
Assess the results of the ASB’s research on the effectiveness of SAS
No. 82, together with information that it has on litigation involving allegations of
fraud, to determine whether it believes that the ASB should consider providing
further guidance on fraud risk assessment.
•
Initiate ongoing reviews with the ASB, the SECPS Peer Review
Committee and the AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee
regarding factors that appear to be influencing audit performance, with a view
toward enhancing auditors’ fraud detection capabilities. (QCIC is in a unique
position to conduct these activities because it usually is the group that
addresses allegations of audit failure on a timely basis and thus can act as a
catalyst for appropriate action.)
Proposed system of governance
6.33 The Panel recommends that QCIC establish a panel of industry
specialists and experts whose members would be drawn from the practicing
profession and industry and who would be available to QCIC members and
the POB and SECPS staffs for consultation on various matters, such as
industry issues and the application of accounting standards.
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The ASB has issued an Exposure Draft enhancing the
fraud standards. QCIC is monitoring and will provide
input as appropriate.
POB Coordinating Task Force is the vehicle that is
accomplishing this Panel recommendation.

In response to this recommendation, the QCIC, at its
February 2001 meeting, recommended immediate
implementation of the following process.
The QCIC will maintain an inventory of member industry
and technical skills. In the event that a QCIC member,
POB or SECPS Staff ("review team") considers
consultation outside the team to be necessary, the first
consultation source will be another QCIC member with

identified industry skills. The review team will be
responsible to make this contact as considered
necessary.
Consultation beyond QCIC membership will be initiated
by the "review team.” This consultation will be
coordinated by the QCIC Senior Technical Manager,
through contact with the Big 5 firm representatives of the
SECPS Executive Committee. It is expected that the
SECPS Executive Committee member will then identify a
specific experienced and highly qualified partner to
consult with the review team. The review team will be
responsible to request such consultation and to identify, if
possible, specific areas in question. The consulting
partner, if not a QCIC member, will not be advised of the
client or auditor name and will not have access to the
case background materials or claim. The QCIC Senior
Technical Manager will be responsible to assure no
conflict exists with firms involved in the case and the
consulting firm.
Enhancing the disciplinary process
6.56 The Panel recommends the following procedures when civil litigation or a
criminal or public regulatory investigation contains allegations of an audit
failure:

1.
Firms should continue to report cases in accordance with QCIC’s current
requirement, but the AICPA should devote more resources to QCIC to speed
up the process.
2.
A firm should, as soon as reasonably possible after the commencement
of the litigation against the firm, conduct an internal review of the subject
engagement to evaluate the performance of the senior engagement
personnel. In addition, in its meeting with the QCIC committee member and
staff and the POB staff, the firm would respond to a standard question
regarding whether the firm had conducted such a review. A person who is
knowledgeable, or one who has become knowledgeable, about the
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The SECPS has adopted a Membership Requirement to
"Improve Disciplinary Process" - Appendix M SECPS
1000.46 "Procedures in Connection with an Alleged Audit
Failure".
This Requirement is to be consistent with the Panel's
recommendation when implemented in accordance with
the QCIC operating procedure that requires a firm to
review other SEC engagement for which engagement
partner is responsible.

circumstances of the engagement should be present at the meeting to discuss
the engagement.
3.
QCIC should conduct its usual inquiries. If QCIC assigns a 3 rating and
there is a subsequent Ethics Division investigation, or assigns a 4 rating, the
Ethics Division would open a case file. The Ethics Division would then inform
the firm that its consideration of the matter was being deferred in accordance
with the Ethics Division’s policy, pending the termination/completion of the
litigation or public regulatory investigation, or the end of the threat of litigation.
4.
Upon notification by the Ethics Division regarding its deferral, and in
order to protect the public, the firm would select one of the following three
options, if it had not already done so, to apply to the engagement partner
during the period of the deferral, if the partner was still with the firm:
A. Terminate or retire the partner
B. Remove the partner from all public company audit engagements until the
Ethics Division’s process is completed
C. Perform an additional second partner review of all public company audit
engagements completed by the partner in the 12 months prior to the deferral.
The firm would report the results of such review to both QCIC and the POB.
Subject the partner to additional oversight on all public company audit
engagements for at least one year by requiring that the concurring partner
review be performed by an experienced senior technical partner appointed by
the firm’s managing partner/CEO. In addition to the required concurring
partner review procedures, this review must include, at a minimum, timely
involvement in:
Significant planning activities
Determination of risk assessments and the design of tests of controls
and substantive audit procedures
Thereafter subject the partner to those additional oversight procedures that the
firm’s managing partner/CEO determines are necessary to protect the public,
based on the firm’s evaluation of the partner’s performance
8.
If the Ethics Division becomes aware of a matter (e.g., through a
complaint letter or newspaper report) involving the financial reporting of an
SEC registrant in which the SECPS member firm has not been made a party,
and the Division otherwise would open an investigation, it instead should refer
the matter to QCIC for further action, and the firm should be notified of such
referral.
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Several cases were put on the QCIC agenda that fell into
this category.

9.
QCIC frequently may not have sufficient information to proceed in
connection with matters in which the firm has not been made a party. In such
cases, QCIC should close the matter without prejudice, and the Ethics Division
should not open a case on the matter. However, QCIC would retain the right to
reopen the matter if it obtained additional information. If the matter ends
without the firm having been made a party, it would remain closed. If the firm
becomes a party at a later date, the QCIC reporting requirement should be
reduced to 15 days for the matter.
10. Once an Ethics Division deferral is lifted, the Ethics Division should
expedite its investigation of the matter. The AICPA should allocate additional
resources to both QCIC and the Ethics Division to enable both bodies to
perform their responsibilities promptly and effectively

The Ethics Division has increased their resources and
the processing of cases involving public companies is a
priority.

AICPA
Professional leadership – the tone at the top
4.7 The Panel recommends that the AICPA develop messages targeted to
both audit professionals and users of audited financial statements that
promote the importance of audits.

Professional development
4.18 The Panel recommends that the AICPA assist firms in adopting the
competency-based learning concepts in the AICPA exposure draft, Statement
on Standards for Continuing Professional Education, and in using a core
competency model that is similar in design to the AICPA model as a basis for
career planning and self-assessing whether individual performance and
competency goals are being achieved.

The AICPA's Audit and Attest staff is developing action
plans to promote and enhance the image of the audit and
the audit and assurance professional. It is anticipated
that these plans will incorporate communications to both
audit professionals and users of audited financial
statements.

The AICPA is finalizing a core competency based model
that will be applicable for auditor and assurance
personnel. Once finalized, this computerized model will
be made available to firms for their use in the career
planning process of establishing competencies and
evaluating staff against those competencies.

Smaller firm considerations
4.32 The Panel recommends that the AICPA:
Provide greater audit-related assistance to smaller firms, particularly
technical and industry accounting and auditing support and consultation

51

The AICPA maintains a technical hotline that provides
accounting and auditing technical assistance to many

Consider additional means by which smaller firms can meet the SECPS
concurring partner requirement

small firms. When industry accounting questions arise
that these individuals are unable to answer, the caller is
referred to another AICPA technical specialist with
expertise in that industry. The AICPA believes that the
availability of the professional standards on-line, coupled
with on-line learning is providing substantial assistance to
small firms.
The SEC Practice Section maintains a database of
individuals who request to perform concurring reviews for
member firms that do not have sufficient resources to
perform that function internally.

Develop software and other tools to assist smaller firms in assessing
engagement risk (client acceptance and continuance)
Proposed system of governance
6.23 The Panel recommends that the auditing profession’s system of
governance be unified under a strengthened, independent POB that oversees
the profession’s activities with respect to standard setting, monitoring,
discipline and special reviews. Accordingly, the POB should oversee the ASB,
the ISB, the SECPS Executive Committee, QCIC, the SECPS Peer Review
Committee, the Professional Issues Task Force (PITF), the SEC Regulations
Committee and the standard-setting activities of the PEEC that relate to audits
of public companies. The POB should serve as the oversight body to whom
the SEC, the state boards of accountancy, the auditing profession and the
public should look for leadership. This leadership position is intended to
enhance communications among the profession’s self-regulatory bodies in
order to facilitate the profession’s continuous improvement efforts and identify
and resolve important issues on a timely basis.

The AICPA and SECPS have worked with the POB for
several months to develop and approve a charter that
meets the spirit of the recommendations contained in the
Panel's report. The AICPA Board of Directors approved
a formal charter for the POB in early 2001.
The SECPS Peer Review and Quality Control Inquiry
Committees are considering the types of information that
could be relevant to the profession or standards setters
for modification of standards or best practices guidance.
These committees are formalizing their processes for
communicating issues that are noted in its reviews or
inquiries to the profession and standard setters.

6.31 The Panel recommends that:
The constituencies (both practitioners and non-practitioners) represented
on the ASB remain unchanged; however, at least a majority of the members
should be from CPA firms that provide attest services to SEC clients
The AICPA provide the resources necessary for the ASB to meet its
mandates
The AICPA provide the resources necessary for the SECPS to meet its
staffing needs, including providing QCIC with the resources needed to enable
it to act quickly in investigating alleged audit failures and thereby preserve the
candid dialogue with SECPS member firms that presently adds to the
effectiveness of the QCIC process
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No action required. Constituency and majority of
members are consistent with recommendation.
Will be assessed annually and reported upon in the POB
Annual Report.
The AICPA has provided and is committed to providing
the financial and human resources necessary for the
SECPS, including the QCIC, to meet its mandates.

The Ethics Division takes all necessary actions to ensure timely
processing of investigations involving audits of SEC registrants when the civil
litigation and public regulatory investigations have been concluded. The Ethics
Division should establish reasonable time frames for these matters and report
the status of all such matters to the POB semiannually.
The ASB, SECPS and PEEC staffs remain employees of the AICPA

The Ethics Division has agreed to make available all
necessary information to meet this Panel
recommendation. However, the data is not available on
a timely basis to include in the 2001 POB annual report.
No action required.

Independence Standards Board
The POB should monitor ISB developments during 2001
and then reach a decision as to the applicability of the
ISB Panel recommendations.
The SEC has amended Financial Reporting Release No.
50 to state that it will no longer look to the ISB for
leadership in establishing and improving auditor
independence standards applicable to auditors of the
financial statements of Commission registrants. The ISB
was dissolved on July 31, 2001.

Non-audit services

5.29 The Panel recommends that, whatever the outcome of the SEC’s rulemaking initiatives, the ISB identify factors to be considered by auditors, audit
committees and client management (a) when implementing Independence
Standard No. 1 and the SEC’s new audit committee disclosure requirements
and (b) when determining whether a specific non-audit service is appropriate.
In determining the appropriateness of a particular service, one guiding
principle should be whether the service facilitates the performance of the audit,
improves the client’s financial reporting process, or is otherwise in the public
interest. The factors to consider might include:
Whether the service is being performed principally for the audit
committee
The effects of the service, if any, on audit effectiveness or on the quality
and timeliness of the entity’s financial reporting process
Whether the service would be performed by specialists (e.g., technology
specialists) who ordinarily also provide recurring audit support
Whether the service would be performed by audit personnel and, if so,
whether it will enhance their knowledge of the entity’s business and operations
Whether the role of those performing the service (e.g., a role where
neutrality, impartiality and auditor skepticism are likely to be subverted) would
be inconsistent with the auditor’s role
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Whether the audit firm’s personnel would be assuming a management
role or creating a mutuality of interest with management
Whether the auditors, in effect, would be “auditing their own numbers”
Whether the project must be started and completed very quickly
Whether the audit firm has unique expertise in the service
The size of the fee(s) for the non-audit service(s)
The Panel recognizes that considerable judgment may be required in reaching
a conclusion regarding the appropriateness of an audit firm’s performing a
specific non-audit service for a specific public audit client.
5.31 The Panel recommends that the SEC and the ISB evaluate on a
continuing basis the effectiveness of the disclosures made under
Independence Standard No. 1 and the SEC’s new audit committee disclosure
requirements, as well as any new rules issued by the ISB or by the SEC
pursuant to its rule-making initiatives.
Proposed system of governance
6.35 The Panel recommends that:
The ISB reconstitute its membership to include four members
representing the public and three members representing the public accounting
profession (currently the membership is four and four)
The public members retain responsibility for the selection of their
replacements, with the POB being consulted on the selections
Two of the members representing the public accounting profession be
selected by the SECPS Executive Committee from member firms, with the
third member continuing to be the AICPA president or his or her designee
The ISB retain sole authority to determine its budget and other
resources.
The ISB retain its staff and the responsibility for their hiring, supervision
and compensation
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International Federation of Accountants
International
7.46 The Panel recommends to IFAC that the global self-regulatory structure
of the international auditing profession meet the following criteria:

A global oversight board (IPOB) is being organized. Its
seven members will come from IFAC, two from IOSCO,
and from leading monetary and lending agencies.
Member nominations are being screened now. IPOB's
initially drafted charter has been modeled after the US
POB's new charter.

Public Interest Oversight
The global self-regulatory structure should have as its centerpiece a
global oversight body to monitor and report on the activities of individual
country self-regulatory organizations (or the member organizations of IFAC
that expressly serve that purpose). The charter of this oversight body should
establish clearly that its primary goal is to serve the public interest.
Membership in this body should be established through a mechanism that
ensures its independence and viability. (The Panel’s recommendations to the
U.S. Public Oversight Board [POB], included in Chapter 6, may be helpful to
IFAC in this regard, recognizing that a global structure would not operate in
exactly the same manner as the POB.)
The global oversight body should ensure that IFAC imposes on its member
organizations clear and unequivocal minimum guidelines for the self-regulation
of the auditing profession in each country subscribing to its oversight.
Timetables for achieving goals should be established on a by-country basis.
International Auditing Practices Committee
The global oversight body should be consulted on the membership
appointments and agenda of IAPC and evaluate the efficacy of the ISAs and
the progress made in achieving their global acceptance. It should ensure that
IAPC’s standards are comprehensive and sufficiently specific and rigorous so
that they serve as appropriate benchmarks to judge the work of auditors. (See
“Establishing Auditing Standards” in Chapter 2 for the Panel’s
recommendations to the ASB.)
IAPC’s deliberations should be open to the public and the basis for and
outcome of its actions published. Dissenting views of its members should be
published to promote the goal of transparency, encourage development of the
highest-quality standards and assist in their proper interpretation.
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Although the IPOB has not yet been formed, IFAC is
seeking to reorganize and strengthen the IAPC.
Intention is to add staff resources and to upgrade the
technical quality of the members.

Quality Assurance over Auditing
A key element of quality assurance by individual self-regulatory
organizations should be external reviews of the quality controls of audit firms
over their accounting and auditing practices. Minimum global standards for
quality control over the audit function should serve as the benchmark for these
reviews. (See “Recent Changes to SECPS Membership Requirements”
above.) IAPC (or an equivalent technical body) should establish these quality
controls standards with due process. The global oversight body should
evaluate these standards and the progress of the individual self-regulatory
organizations in promoting external reviews and reporting on their results.
(See the Panel’s recommendation to the SEC in the section “Enhancing Peer
Reviews” in Chapter 6.)

TAC is designing a global peer review process. They
anticipate a three-stage implementation of (1)
benchmarking (agreed-upon procedures to compare firm
policies with IFAC standards on auditing, quality control,
and ethics); (2) compliance (evaluation of internal
inspection programs), and (3) global peer reviews. It is
anticipated that all three stages are to be completed for
all firms in about five years. Some peer reviewers are
likely to be appointed beginning this summer. US-based
firms are likely to use their existing peer reviewers.

Ethics and Independence
The oversight body should evaluate the adequacy of IFAC’s ethics
standards, including independence standards (for firms and individual
auditors), in serving the interests of public investors, creditors and other users
of financial statements.
Education
The oversight body should assess IFAC’s process for evaluating the
education and training of auditors on a by-country basis and its initiatives for
establishing high-level, minimum educational standards for the auditing
profession. This process should include monitoring the progress of the
profession in each country toward achieving established goals.
By-Country Monitoring, Investigations and Discipline
The global oversight body should establish a framework for monitoring
the accountancy profession to guide the individual country self-regulatory
organizations (or equivalent bodies, if not formally designated as selfregulatory organizations).
Key elements that the global oversight body should ask each country’s selfregulatory organization to address include: (1) accounting standards adopted
and in use and the status of efforts toward convergence with IASC standards,
(2) auditing standards adopted and in use and the status of efforts to apply
IAPC standards, (3) ethics (including independence) standards adopted and in
use and the status of efforts to adopt international standards as a minimum,
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TAC is looking at a system of investigations, and is
considering a QCIC-type model as well as the UK joint
monitoring and other models.

(4) educational levels and skills and the status of efforts to achieve goals, (5)
quality reviews (including peer reviews) and the status of efforts to achieve
goals, (6) monitoring of practice quality by investigating allegations of audit
deficiencies or failures and the status of efforts to achieve goals, (7)
disciplinary activities and the status of efforts to achieve goals, and (8) the
regulatory environment over global financing and changes occurring in that
environment.
Membership Requirements of IFAC-sponsored Group of Audit Firms
Membership requirements of the proposed group of audit firms that will
work with IFAC to raise international standards should include periodic reports
by those firms to the global oversight body about their structure and
operations.

This recommendation may be considered after the IPOB
is formed. FOF includes the Big 5, and most sizable
transnational audit firms, who audit a high percentage of
listed companies around the world. Most firms have a
US unit that is a member of SECPS. FOF members will
pay all costs of the IPOB, the FOF and some IFAC costs.
FOF's constitution and operating procedures were
approved in April by the FOF and IFAC.
TAC has fifteen members, the Big 5 plus 10 other firms.
TAC has observers on key IFAC committees. It has just
hired a director and is seeking a senior technical
manager.

Monitoring the Global Auditing Profession
A system for monitoring the global auditing profession should be
established by IFAC that provides for reporting to the global oversight body by
the individual self-regulatory organizations. This monitoring activity should
address the key elements described above for individual countries.
Reporting to the Public
There should be comprehensive annual reports to the public by the
global oversight body on its activities, including the results of its monitoring of
the quality assurance functions for the auditing profession on a by-country
basis. Such reporting should describe the nature of the self-regulatory
processes followed in each country and the results of reporting by each
country’s individual self-regulatory organization. These reports should address
the progress being made by each country toward achieving goals in the areas
of standards, quality assurance, ethics and independence, education,
monitoring and investigations, and discipline. The global oversight body’s goal
should be to bring “transparency” to how the global auditing profession
functions and serves the interests of investors.
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International Auditing Practices Committee
International
7.48 The Panel recommends that the ASB and IAPC initiate a formal
collaborative effort to harmonize auditing standards and achieve their global
acceptance. Others interested in auditing standard setting should be invited to
participate in this effort.
7.49 While the Panel encourages this initiative, it also believes that such an
effort should be conducted in parallel with the ASB’s consideration of its other
recommendations. (See the Panel’s recommendation to the POB and the ASB
under “Establishing Auditing Standards” in Chapter 2.)

State Boards of Accountancy
Proposed system of governance
6.28 The Panel recommends that the POB and state boards of accountancy,
perhaps through the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy,
determine how best to facilitate meaningful continuing dialogue between the
POB and state boards.

Member Firms of the SECPS Represented on the
SECPS Executive Committee
Proposed system of governance
6.34 The Panel recommends that each member firm ensure that its
representative on the SECPS Executive Committee has sufficient authority
and responsibility to commit the firm to the protection of the public interest
when this conflicts with a more favorable business position, and ensure that
the public interest remains the paramount objective in the representative’s
decision making and voting.
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